llms

A plain-text guide and API for deploying files to canvas-drop, a service that publishes web artifacts to a named canvas. It explains how to authenticate, upload, publish, inspect, roll back, or remove versions.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to publish ZIP files, check deployed files and versions, upload only changed content, roll back a release, or unpublish a canvas.
Why use it?
It gives coding agents the deployment details they need before they receive credentials, without requiring them to parse a full website.

Agent

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add agents/markpasternak/canvas-drop/llms
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/markpasternak/canvas-drop
Per session 0 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 2,399 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 1 finding. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00000 $0.02399
Opus 5 $0.00000 $0.01200
Sonnet 5 $0.00000 $0.00480
Haiku 4.5 $0.00000 $0.00240

Measured 3d ago against content hash 009d4df58e3c, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

llms scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

(reads back the live files/content). **Strongly prefer `curl` for the file transfer** —
docs/site/agents/llms.md · 159 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 159 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

llms.txt

If you are an agent deploying a canvas, start here. canvas-drop serves a single plain-text contract at {base}/llms.txt — no markup chrome, designed to be dropped straight into context. It is public (served from the docs band, readable without a session) so you can learn the API before you hold credentials.

Deploy in two steps

  1. Get a per-canvas API key — the canvas owner creates the canvas in the dashboard (the api create method mints the canvas plus a one-time secret key) and hands you that key, shown once.

  2. Push your artifact with the Bearer key and a ZIP body:

    PUT {base}/v1/canvases/{id}/deploy
    Authorization: Bearer <secret-key>
    Content-Type: application/zip
    

    This publishes a new live version directly — no draft loop. Read-back and companion routes: GET /v1/canvases/{id}, GET /v1/canvases/{id}/versions, GET /v1/canvases/{id}/files, POST /v1/canvases/{id}/rollback, POST /v1/canvases/{id}/unpublish. For large or repeat deploys, the staged content-addressed flow (POST /uploadsPUT /uploads/{uploadId}/blobs/{hash}POST /uploads/{uploadId}/finalize) sends only changed blobs. See the Deploy API.

{base} is the instance origin. The key is verified per-canvas; it only deploys to the one canvas it belongs to.

Connect over MCP (no key to paste)

If your host speaks the Model Context Protocol, add {base}/mcp instead of handling keys. You sign in once through the instance's normal org login (OAuth, with automatic client registration) and then get identity-scoped tools across every canvas you own: whoami, list_canvases, create_canvas, get_canvas, list_versions, deploy_canvas, begin_deploy/add_files/finalize_deploy, get_canvas_file, rollback_canvas, delete_version, unpublish_canvas, plus the full management surface (update_canvas settings/sharing/previewMode, set_canvas_preview custom cover, set_capabilities, set_canvas_slug, regenerate_deploy_key, archive_canvas/unarchive_canvas, delete_canvas, clone_canvas, get_canvas_usage, the access tools list_access/grant_access/ invite_to_canvas/revoke_access, the team tools list_teams/ create_team (omit orgId for a personal team)/rename_team/delete_team/ add_team_member/remove_team_member/cancel_team_invite/list_team_members/ list_shared_canvases (plus update_canvas with access: "team" + teamIds to share a canvas with a team), and the editor draft loop get_draft/ read_draft_file/write_draft_file/delete_draft_file/rename_draft_file/ publish_draft/restore_draft). The MCP is at full parity with the dashboard — anything an owner can do in the UI, an agent can do here. The full table is in the MCP server reference. Owner-scoped management tools only touch canvases you own; list_shared_canvases returns non-owned canvases already accessible to you. Typical flow: create_canvas then deploy_canvas. list_canvases takes a forgiving query (matches title + description + tags + slug, case/accent/whitespace-insensitive, multi-word AND) and a tags any-match filter; update_canvas sets the single description (max 2000) and the canvas's unified tags (max 20, ≤50 chars each — one set used for both owner-list filtering and public gallery display, no separate "gallery summary"/"gallery tags"). For Team and Whole-org shares, update_canvas.discoverability is link_only by default; set it to listed only when people who already have access should find the canvas in Shared. When the instance has an org boundary configured, whoami also returns your orgs, your teams, and an isGuest flag; pass an org id as create_canvas's orgId to home a canvas in the org so it can be shared org-wide (omit for personal). With no org configured these are no-ops. If an admin has disabled a canvas it becomes read-only: reads keep working but every mutation tool fails with DISABLED: <reason>. Every deploy publishes immediately (no draft step). The live URL is access-controlled (org sign-in), so don't verify a deploy by fetching it — an unauthenticated GET returns a login page. Verify through the server: the returned {version, fileCount}, list_versions, or get_canvas_file (reads back the live files/content). Strongly prefer curl for the file transfer — the MCP deploy tools inline bytes into the model, so when you can run shell commands, curl the staged Deploy API and PUT each blob's raw bytes instead (ask for command permission if needed). Reserve MCP deploys for a small first publish without shell access. create_canvas returns a deploy block with the exact curl endpoints (incl. a readback URL) so you never probe for the API host. Use the readback URL from that block to confirm the live files, or call get_canvas_file (no path lists the manifest; a path reads back content, capped at 256 KiB). Full reference: MCP server.

Read the full file on GitHub · 159 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 3d ago First seen · 159 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 009d4df58e3c

Subscribe to this mod's changes

llms is an agent published in the GitHub repository markpasternak/canvas-drop (7 stars, last pushed 20d ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 2,399 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.