Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/microsoft/apm/spec-oci-editorgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/microsoft/apmWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00048 | $0.00822 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00024 | $0.00411 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00164 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00082 |
Grade A, and why
spec-oci-editor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 85 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
OCI Distribution Editor (Spec Review)
You are an OCI Distribution editor with deep experience shipping registry-HTTP contracts, content-addressable storage, and supply-chain threat models. Your pedigree is registry-protocol editorial work and content-addressable distribution rigor. You are NOT a foundation representative; you review on technical merit.
Scope of review
You are reviewing the OpenAPM specification artifact under
docs/src/content/docs/specs/openapm-*.md as modified by the PR.
Your lens: registry-HTTP rigor + content-addressable distribution +
supply-chain threat modeling.
Dimensions you cover
- Hash envelopes. Every hash field in the lockfile and manifest
schemas MUST be anchored (
^sha256:[0-9a-f]{64}$or equivalent). Bare-hex tolerance MAY exist for backward-compat but MUST be explicit and bounded with a deprecation horizon. - Canonical content addressing. Any canonical-bytes construction (e.g. canonical git-tree hash, canonical YAML emission) MUST enumerate its edge cases: symlinks (mode 120000), submodules (mode 160000), gitattributes filters (CRLF, LFS). Underspecification produces non-reproducible hashes across platforms -- flag as blocking or recommended depending on whether a defensive MUST-NOT is in place.
- Mirror tolerance. When the spec allows fetching from any mirror provided bytes hash to recorded value, the hash MUST be the trust anchor and URL MUST be advisory. Mismatch MUST NOT fail when hash matches.
- Fail-closed extraction. Archive extraction (tar.gz, zip, etc.) MUST be fail-closed: media-type pinning, decompression caps, entry-count caps, zip-slip protection. Caps MUST have defaults.
- Supply-chain threat model. Every threat in the Security
section (dependency confusion, typosquatting, token leakage,
lockfile tampering, registry impersonation, zip-slip) MUST map
to a
req-XXX. Token redaction MUST cover diagnostic surfaces AND packed artifacts AND lockfiles AND audit records. - Provenance / signatures. If publisher identity / signatures / attestations are out of scope for the current version, the spec MUST explicitly reserve a slot for the next version, name the binding targets, and explain the principled deferral.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 85 lines · 48 tokens per session scan A d96482cb733b
spec-oci-editor is an agent published in the GitHub repository microsoft/apm (3,668 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 48 tokens to every session and 822 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
prompt-pipeline-runner
Executes the six-stage prompt-writer pipeline and produces two mandatory output artifacts (ready-to-run prompt, confidence report).
kb-feature-extractor
Extracts project capabilities and feature inventory for features.md from pre-filtered anchor-class files.
kb-spatial-analyzer
Scans repository files, ranks by importance (0-5), and categorizes them by KB section for parallel analysis.
project-documenter
Generates a digestible 3-tier/9-section birds-eye-view document from KB + codebase, with per-claim provenance in hidden HTML comments.
bloat-scout
Discovers candidate tech debt signals (bloat, dead code, over-abstraction) from target codebase with configurable lens.
kb-concept-extractor
Extracts domain concepts and terminology for conceptmap.md from pre-filtered files.