Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/morodomi/redteam-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/morodomi/redteam-skills/wordpress-attacker)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/morodomi/redteam-skills/wordpress-attacker"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/morodomi/redteam-skills/wordpress-attacker/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/morodomi/redteam-skills/wordpress-attacker"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/morodomi/redteam-skills/wordpress-attacker.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00036 | $0.02562 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00014 | $0.01025 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00512 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00256 |
Grade A, and why
wordpress-attacker scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 293 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
WordPress Attacker
WordPress固有の脆弱性を静的解析で検出するエージェント。
Detection Targets
| Category | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| wp-sqli | SQL Injection | $wpdb without prepare |
| wp-xss | Cross-site Scripting | echo $_GET/$_POST without escaping |
| wp-lfi | Local File Inclusion | include/require with user input |
| wp-privilege | Privilege Escalation | Missing current_user_can check |
| wp-config | Misconfiguration | WP_DEBUG enabled, weak keys |
| wp-rest-api | Broken Access Control | Missing permission_callback |
| wp-xmlrpc | Misconfiguration | XML-RPC without restriction |
| wp-user-enum | Information Exposure | User enumeration via REST/feed |
| wp-deserialize | Object Injection | Unsafe unserialize with user input |
Framework Detection Patterns
| Context | Vulnerable Pattern | Safe Pattern |
|---|---|---|
| Database | $wpdb->query("...$var") |
$wpdb->prepare("...%s", $var) |
| Output | echo $_GET['x'] |
echo esc_html($_GET['x']) |
| File | include($_GET['f']) |
include(plugin_dir_path(__FILE__) . 'file.php') |
| AJAX | add_action('wp_ajax_x', 'fn') without check |
if (!current_user_can('edit_posts')) wp_die() |
| REST API | 'permission_callback' => '__return_true' |
'permission_callback' => function() { return current_user_can('edit_posts'); } |
Dangerous Patterns
SQL Injection ($wpdb)
patterns:
# Direct query with variable interpolation
- '\$wpdb->query\s*\(\s*["\'].*\$'
- '\$wpdb->get_results\s*\(\s*["\'].*\$'
- '\$wpdb->get_row\s*\(\s*["\'].*\$'
- '\$wpdb->get_var\s*\(\s*["\'].*\$'
# Insert/Update/Delete with user input (format array bypass)
- '\$wpdb->insert\s*\([^)]*\$_(GET|POST|REQUEST)'
- '\$wpdb->update\s*\([^)]*\$_(GET|POST|REQUEST)'
- '\$wpdb->delete\s*\([^)]*\$_(GET|POST|REQUEST)'
# User input in query
- '\$wpdb->query\s*\([^)]*\$_(GET|POST|REQUEST)'
Cross-site Scripting (XSS)
patterns:
# Direct echo of user input
- 'echo\s+\$_GET\s*\['
- 'echo\s+\$_POST\s*\['
- 'echo\s+\$_REQUEST\s*\['
- 'print\s+\$_GET\s*\['
- 'print\s+\$_POST\s*\['
# printf with user input
- 'printf\s*\([^)]*\$_GET'
- 'printf\s*\([^)]*\$_POST'
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 293 lines · 36 tokens per session scan A 5a29656d016b
wordpress-attacker is an agent published in the GitHub repository morodomi/redteam-skills (2 stars, last pushed 8mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 36 tokens to every session and 2,562 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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