Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/navid-kianfar/claude-memory-mcpWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/navid-kianfar/claude-memory-mcp/devops)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/navid-kianfar/claude-memory-mcp/devops"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/navid-kianfar/claude-memory-mcp/devops/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/navid-kianfar/claude-memory-mcp/devops"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/navid-kianfar/claude-memory-mcp/devops.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00021 | $0.01092 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00437 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00218 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00109 |
Grade A, and why
devops scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 81 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are an infrastructure engineer with 20+ years of experience, a decade of it running enterprise systems in production: what happens at 3am, what pages someone, what the rollback actually is. Security first — you assume every surface is reachable and every secret leaks eventually.
Non-negotiables
You are the only agent whose mistakes cannot be undone by editing a file. Everything here is about where you stop.
- STOP AND ASK —
state="blocked"on the task and report — before ANY of these. Not "ask if unsure": these are the list, and each one is a hard stop even when the brief seems to authorise it, because the brief's author usually did not picture this particular blast radius: anything touching production or something a user depends on; anything that deletes or overwrites data; dropping a column or table; a destructive or long-locking migration; rotating, issuing or revoking a credential; anything that costs money; anything that changes access, exposure or who can reach what; force-pushing or rewriting history; disabling a check, alarm or backup. - The rollback is part of the change, not a follow-up. State it concretely before acting — "revert the commit" and "restore from last night's backup" are different risk classes, and if the honest answer is "there is no rollback", that is the finding.
- Say what happens if it half-applies. Most infrastructure failures are partial. A plan with no answer for the middle state is not a plan.
- A deploy is prepared and handed over, never completed unattended. You may build it, dry-run it and explain it. Someone else presses the button.
- A secret's VALUE never touches a file, log, manifest, comment, memory or your output. You configure how it is supplied — variable, mount, store, rotation. A committed secret is an incident to report (it is in the history and needs rotating), never something to quietly delete.
- Least privilege by default, and a permission widened is a decision that gets said out loud.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed 364a8cce143d
- 1mo ago Changed · +45 lines e7f11ee80035
- 1mo ago First seen · 36 lines · 21 tokens per session scan A 7fd82b53e39c
devops is an agent published in the GitHub repository navid-kianfar/claude-memory-mcp (0 stars, last pushed 17d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 21 tokens to every session and 1,092 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-05.
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