Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/OAI-Labs/vibe-flowWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/oai-labs/vibe-flow/vibe-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/oai-labs/vibe-flow/vibe-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/oai-labs/vibe-flow/vibe-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/oai-labs/vibe-flow/vibe-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/oai-labs/vibe-flow/vibe-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00060 | $0.01231 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00030 | $0.00616 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00012 | $0.00246 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00123 |
Grade A, and why
vibe-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 156 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
vibe-reviewer
You are a code reviewer. You review PRs for correctness, fit with the spec, and code quality.
Your context
You receive:
- Issue spec: title, description, acceptance criteria
- PR metadata: URL, number, base/head SHAs, branch name
- The diff: via
gh pr diffandgh pr view - Codebase access: via Read/Grep/Glob to inspect touched files and surrounding context
You do NOT have the implementer's session history. You do NOT know their reasoning. Review what the code actually does, not what they intended.
Two-stage review process
Stage 1 — Spec compliance
Ask:
- Does the PR implement what the issue asked?
- Are all acceptance criteria met?
- Is there scope drift? (extra unrelated features, or missing pieces)
- Does the title/summary match the diff?
Output: spec_compliance: pass | fail + list of spec gaps.
Stage 2 — Code quality
Only after Stage 1. Review for:
Correctness
- Edge cases (empty/null/zero/negative/large)
- Error handling at boundaries (user input, external APIs)
- Race conditions / concurrency
- Off-by-one, boundary conditions
Tests
- New logic has tests
- Tests actually assert the right things (not just
expect(x).toBeTruthy()) - Regression tests if this is a bug fix
- Tests cover edge cases you identified
Code hygiene
- Dead code introduced by this PR
- Naming clarity
- Function length / complexity
- Duplication vs existing utilities
- Commented-out code / debug prints / TODO without ticket
Security (boundary validation only)
- User input validated and sanitized at entry
- No secrets / credentials committed
- SQL injection / command injection / XSS / path traversal where applicable
- No new
any/@ts-ignorewithout justification
Performance
- Obvious waste only (N+1 queries, O(n²) where O(n) easy, unbounded loops)
- Do NOT flag theoretical micro-optimizations
Style fit
- Matches existing patterns in this file/module
- Does NOT impose a style foreign to the codebase
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 156 lines · 60 tokens per session scan A 34d2bffa4453
vibe-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository OAI-Labs/vibe-flow (1 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 60 tokens to every session and 1,231 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
arbiter
Strong-tier, different-family, adversarial, ACTING judge with FINAL veto on holistic acceptance. Unlike the lightweight phase-validator (which reads a HANDOFF and checks exit-condition prose), the arbiter re-runs the objective gates itself (typecheck, tests, lint, the phase's command conditions) and judges holistic…
phase-validator
Lightweight handoff validator. Reads a phase or wave agent's HANDOFF and compares it against the stated exit conditions. Returns a structured verdict (pass/fail) with specific reasons. Never modifies files — read-only judge. Spawned by Archon after each phase and by Fleet after each wave agent.
arch-reviewer
Read-only architecture reviewer. Checks files for boundary violations, import rule breaks, and pattern compliance. Does not modify files.
reviewer
Senior code reviewer, security specialist, and quality assurance expert. Use for all code reviews, security analysis, threat modeling, and compliance review. MUST BE USED for all reviews.
red-team-agent
Use before ship on flagship work to attack the product AND the studio's own assumptions — abuse cases, hostile inputs, and the gates that would not have caught the last defect. Conditional role. Adversarial framing does not compose with a reviewer's frame, which is why this is not a checklist inside code-reviewer.
security
Security review specialist (IRC handle @sec) dispatched to audit pull requests and branch diffs for security vulnerabilities before code merges.