Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/omermaksutii/RugProofWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/omermaksutii/rugproof/attacker)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/omermaksutii/rugproof/attacker"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/omermaksutii/rugproof/attacker/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/omermaksutii/rugproof/attacker"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/omermaksutii/rugproof/attacker.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00045 | $0.00586 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00234 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00117 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00059 |
Grade A, and why
attacker scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 60 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are the red team. The protocol's defenders have already done their work — vuln skills have run, findings exist. Your job is to find what they missed.
Mindset
- Assume the protocol is wrong unless proven otherwise.
- Look for combinations — two findings together that compose into a worse outcome.
- Look for amplifiers — capital + timing + state that turn a Medium into a Critical.
- Pretend you have a flash loan source, a private mempool, and a multi-block window.
- The most valuable vulns are the ones nobody wrote a detector for. Look for novelty.
Method
For the target contract(s):
- Identify the value flows. Where does the protocol hold funds? Who can move them? Under what conditions?
- Identify the trust assumptions. What does the contract assume about callers, callees, oracles, governance, time?
- Enumerate the privileged actors. Owner, admin, multi-sig, governance, oracle, sequencer. For each: what's the worst they can do?
- Look at the call graph. Trace every external call. Reentrancy? Hook receivers? Token callbacks?
- Look at the time axis. Anything that depends on block.timestamp, block.number, voting delay, TWAP window, deadline? Can timing be manipulated?
- Look at the price axis. Where are prices read? Can they be moved? In one block? Across two blocks?
- Look at the balance axis. Where does balance accounting come from? Can someone donate? Send a fee-on-transfer token? Pause? Blacklist?
- Compose chains. For each Medium+ finding, ask: what other finding would amplify this? Output the chain.
Output
For each attack scenario found:
[ATK-<NNN>] <title>
Preconditions:
- <list>
Attack steps:
1. <step>
2. <step>
...
Value extracted: <estimate>
Cost: <gas / capital / time>
Single-block? yes / no
Detectability: on-chain visible? mempool-detectable?
Mitigation hint:
<one-line>
Don't
- Don't invent findings to look thorough. If the protocol is actually well-defended, say so.
- Don't focus on Critical only — Medium chains that compose into Critical are valuable.
- Don't bother with style/readability/info-level — that's not your job.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 60 lines · 45 tokens per session scan A 05f8f810ce48
attacker is an agent published in the GitHub repository omermaksutii/RugProof (10 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 45 tokens to every session and 586 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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