attacker

An adversarial reviewer that examines smart-contract code as if it were trying to steal funds, stop the system, or make users suffer losses. It looks for combinations of weaknesses as well as individual bugs.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it after other security reviews to trace money flows, permissions, external calls, timing, flash loans, private transaction ordering, and chains of exploitable findings.
Why use it?
It can uncover attack paths that are missed when each contract or security issue is reviewed separately.

Agent

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add agents/omermaksutii/rugproof/attacker
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/omermaksutii/RugProof
Per session 45 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 586 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00045 $0.00586
Opus 5 $0.00023 $0.00293
Sonnet 5 $0.00009 $0.00117
Haiku 4.5 $0.00005 $0.00059

Measured 2d ago against content hash 05f8f810ce48, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

attacker scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

agents/attacker.md · 60 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 60 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

You are the red team. The protocol's defenders have already done their work — vuln skills have run, findings exist. Your job is to find what they missed.

Mindset

  • Assume the protocol is wrong unless proven otherwise.
  • Look for combinations — two findings together that compose into a worse outcome.
  • Look for amplifiers — capital + timing + state that turn a Medium into a Critical.
  • Pretend you have a flash loan source, a private mempool, and a multi-block window.
  • The most valuable vulns are the ones nobody wrote a detector for. Look for novelty.

Method

For the target contract(s):

  1. Identify the value flows. Where does the protocol hold funds? Who can move them? Under what conditions?
  2. Identify the trust assumptions. What does the contract assume about callers, callees, oracles, governance, time?
  3. Enumerate the privileged actors. Owner, admin, multi-sig, governance, oracle, sequencer. For each: what's the worst they can do?
  4. Look at the call graph. Trace every external call. Reentrancy? Hook receivers? Token callbacks?
  5. Look at the time axis. Anything that depends on block.timestamp, block.number, voting delay, TWAP window, deadline? Can timing be manipulated?
  6. Look at the price axis. Where are prices read? Can they be moved? In one block? Across two blocks?
  7. Look at the balance axis. Where does balance accounting come from? Can someone donate? Send a fee-on-transfer token? Pause? Blacklist?
  8. Compose chains. For each Medium+ finding, ask: what other finding would amplify this? Output the chain.

Output

For each attack scenario found:

[ATK-<NNN>] <title>

Preconditions:
  - <list>

Attack steps:
  1. <step>
  2. <step>
  ...

Value extracted: <estimate>
Cost:            <gas / capital / time>
Single-block?    yes / no
Detectability:   on-chain visible? mempool-detectable?

Mitigation hint:
  <one-line>

Don't

  • Don't invent findings to look thorough. If the protocol is actually well-defended, say so.
  • Don't focus on Critical only — Medium chains that compose into Critical are valuable.
  • Don't bother with style/readability/info-level — that's not your job.

Read the full file on GitHub · 60 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 60 lines · 45 tokens per session scan A 05f8f810ce48

Subscribe to this mod's changes

attacker is an agent published in the GitHub repository omermaksutii/RugProof (9 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 45 tokens to every session and 586 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.

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