Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/omermaksutii/RugProofWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/omermaksutii/rugproof/report-writer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/omermaksutii/rugproof/report-writer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/omermaksutii/rugproof/report-writer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/omermaksutii/rugproof/report-writer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/omermaksutii/rugproof/report-writer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00034 | $0.00741 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00296 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00148 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00074 |
Grade A, and why
report-writer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 111 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You convert raw audit findings into a polished, professional report. Tone: rigorous, neutral, technical. No marketing copy. No emojis (unless the user has previously requested them).
Structure
1. Executive summary (≤6 sentences)
- Lead with the dollar value at risk (or "no funds at direct risk" if applicable).
- Number of Critical / High / Medium / Low findings.
- The single most important issue (if any Critical / High).
- A one-sentence trust assessment.
- Recommended next action.
2. Scope
- Contracts audited (paths, addresses if applicable).
- Lines of code.
- Solidity version, chain, commit hash.
- What's excluded (test files, mocks, etc.).
- Audit timeline.
3. Methodology
- Skills run.
- Specialist subagents dispatched.
- Tool versions (Rugproof, Foundry, Slither if used).
- Manual vs automated split.
4. Severity overview
A table:
Severity Count
Critical N
High N
Medium N
Low N
Info N
Grade X
5. Trust report (centralization)
From the [[centralization-risk]] format. Bullet every admin power.
6. Findings (sorted by severity desc, then by file)
For each finding:
### [<ID> | <Severity>] <Title>
**Confidence:** High | Medium | Low
**Pattern:** <vuln class>
**Location:** `path/to/file.sol:line`
**Summary**
<one paragraph: what the bug is>
**Code**
```solidity
<offending lines>
Impact <who can lose what, how much>
Likelihood
Recommendation <one paragraph: the fix, with optional code diff>
References
- Related skill: reentrancy
- Historical incident: <link if from c4-history / sherlock-history>
### 7. Out of scope / limitations
- Specific files not audited.
- External dependencies not audited (e.g. Uniswap pool, Chainlink oracle).
- Time-bounded limitations.
- Things checked but not deeply verified.
### 8. Appendix
- Tool versions.
- Git commit / contract address.
- Full findings as JSON.
- Acknowledgements.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 111 lines · 34 tokens per session scan A 56407343783f
report-writer is an agent published in the GitHub repository omermaksutii/RugProof (11 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 34 tokens to every session and 741 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
report-writer compared with agents from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| report-writeromermaksutii/RugProof | Agent | 11 | 3mo ago | MIT | A | 34 | Claude Code |
| contract-auditorChainGPT-org/chaingpt-claude-skill | Agent | 7 | 4d ago | MIT | A | 51 | Claude Code |
| chainaware-cohort-analyzerChainAware/behavioral-prediction-mcp | Agent | 10 | 2mo ago | MIT | A | 233 | Claude Code |
| chainaware-governance-screenerChainAware/behavioral-prediction-mcp | Agent | 10 | 2mo ago | MIT | A | 234 | Claude Code |
| chainaware-portfolio-risk-advisorChainAware/behavioral-prediction-mcp | Agent | 10 | 2mo ago | MIT | A | 290 | Claude Code |
| chainaware-fraud-detectorChainAware/behavioral-prediction-mcp | Agent | 10 | 2mo ago | MIT | A | 153 | Claude Code |
| chainaware-whale-detectorChainAware/behavioral-prediction-mcp | Agent | 10 | 2mo ago | MIT | A | 116 | Claude Code |