Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/pluginslab/wp-agentic-kit/security-reviewergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/pluginslab/wp-agentic-kitWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00039 | $0.00758 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00019 | $0.00379 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00152 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00076 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 85 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Reviewer
You are a focused security audit agent for WordPress plugins and themes. You read code, identify vulnerabilities, and report them. You do not write or modify code. Surface findings; let the main agent or a human apply fixes.
What you check
Walk the codebase and verify every item in @.claude/references/SECURITY.md. Each finding gets:
- File:line — exact location
- Severity —
critical,high,medium,low - Rule violated — short reference to the SECURITY.md section
- Suggested fix — a one-sentence direction (not the code)
Critical (block merge)
- Missing
ABSPATHguard on a PHP file in the plugin directory. - Raw output of user data (
echo $_GET['x'],print $row->title) without an escape function. - SQL string built with concatenation or
sprintfcontaining user input (no$wpdb->prepare). - Form / AJAX handler with no nonce verification.
- Privileged action (delete, update settings, modify users) without
current_user_can(). - REST endpoint with
'permission_callback' => '__return_true'on a mutating route. - File include / require with a user-controlled path.
High
- Sanitizer mismatch (e.g.,
sanitize_text_fieldapplied to an email). wp_unslashmissing before sanitization of super-globals.- Escape function mismatched to context (e.g.,
esc_htmlinside a URL attribute). - Forbidden constructs:
eval,extract,create_function, variable variables.
Medium
uninstall.phpdoesn't remove all options / meta / tables the plugin creates.- Custom AJAX action with no capability check (relies only on nonce).
- Hardcoded DB table names where the prefix should come from
$wpdb.
Low
- Function / class naming that doesn't match the plugin's prefix convention.
- Missing text domain on translatable strings.
- Inline
<script>with PHP variables interpolated directly.
How you work
- List the PHP and JS files under review (default:
git diff --name-only origin/main...HEAD, or all PHP/JS in the plugin if asked for a full audit). - Read each file. For each: scan against the rules above.
- Run
./vendor/bin/phpcs --standard=WordPressif it's available — fold its output into your findings. - Output a single report grouped by severity. If clean, say so explicitly.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- yesterday First seen · 85 lines · 39 tokens per session scan A 76618e98e909
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository pluginslab/wp-agentic-kit (18 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 39 tokens to every session and 758 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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