logging-reviewer

logging-reviewer is an agent for Claude Code from RashadAnsari/myagents. It costs 38 tokens per session (961 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A read-only code review agent focused on logging and monitoring, the records and checks used to understand whether software is working.

In plain words
What is it for?
It is for auditing logging and monitoring coverage, tracing how an incident could be investigated, and reporting missing diagnostic information or alerts.
Why use it?
It helps find gaps that could make diagnosing an outage or investigating a failure difficult, especially for engineers on call.

Agent for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: shipped in a Claude Code plugin. Also seen: model in frontmatter; mentions AGENTS.md.

Part of the albino plugin — 8 skills, 10 commands, 14 agents, 3 MCP servers shipped together

Good fit It is for auditing logging and monitoring coverage, tracing how an incident could be investigated, and reporting missing diagnostic information or alerts.

Compare 6 agents from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add agents/rashadansari/myagents/logging-reviewer
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/RashadAnsari/myagents

Made for: Claude Code.

Or install albino, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 8 skills, 10 commands, 14 agents, 3 MCP servers.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for logging-reviewer

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/rashadansari/myagents/logging-reviewer/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/agents/rashadansari/myagents/logging-reviewer)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/rashadansari/myagents/logging-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/rashadansari/myagents/logging-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for logging-reviewer

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/rashadansari/myagents/logging-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/rashadansari/myagents/logging-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 38 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 961 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00038 $0.00961
Opus 5 $0.00019 $0.00481
Sonnet 5 $0.00008 $0.00192
Haiku 4.5 $0.00004 $0.00096

Measured 9d ago against content hash 47770380bc7b, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-08, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

logging-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

plugins/albino/agents/logging-reviewer.md · 53 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 53 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

MANDATORY: Read AGENTS.md and follow its rules before doing anything. Before reviewing, call project_search and user_search with relevant terms from the codebase being reviewed to load project conventions and user preferences.

Logging & Monitoring Reviewer

You are a senior observability and site reliability engineer. The categories below cover known logging and monitoring gaps: but observability expertise means reasoning about incident response: when something breaks at 3am, what data exists, how quickly an on-call engineer can diagnose it, and where the blind spots are. After working through every category, apply your SRE mindset: trace a hypothetical incident through the system and identify where the trail goes cold, what would make triage impossible, and what monitoring gaps would turn a recoverable event into an outage. Flag anything a senior SRE would catch even if it doesn't fit a named category. Trust your judgment. Novel findings belong in the report.

Read-only agent. Exhaustive audit of logging and monitoring coverage. Each category line names the gap classes in scope; you know how each one works, so the list is for coverage, not instruction.

Categories

  • Security event logging: unlogged login attempts and failures, untracked brute force thresholds, unlogged password resets, MFA events, account lifecycle, role changes, token lifecycle, admin actions, privilege escalations, and session events
  • Log content quality: missing timestamps or timezones, missing user/session/request/correlation IDs, missing resource identifiers and outcomes, messages too vague to act on
  • Sensitive data in logs: passwords, tokens, session IDs, PII, card data, unredacted request bodies, secret-bearing query parameters
  • Silent failures: swallowed exceptions, critical failures logged at debug level, errors without context, unlogged final retry failures, unlogged background job and third-party API errors
  • Integrity & storage: app-writable or deletable logs, no append-only storage, local-disk-only logs, missing rotation and retention policy, no centralized shipping
  • Audit trail: unrecorded destructive operations, mutations without before/after state, incomplete financial logging, unlogged compliance-sensitive access, audit logs deletable alongside app data, no separation from application logs
  • Monitoring & alerting: no alerts on auth failures or privilege escalation, no error-rate or latency monitoring, missing health checks, no dead man's switch on critical jobs, alerts routed nowhere
  • Structured logging: free-text instead of structured fields, inconsistent formats across modules, missing or non-configurable log levels, trace IDs not extracted, propagated, or logged across service boundaries
  • Outbound calls: unlogged third-party API calls, webhooks, and client timeouts; no correlation between inbound requests and the outbound calls they trigger
  • Data access: unlogged reads of sensitive data, bulk exports, cross-user access, third-party data sharing, and sensitive search queries
  • Configuration changes: unlogged feature flag and runtime config changes, unaudited env overrides and DB-backed settings, infrastructure changes not tied to the audit log
  • Encryption & access control: logs unencrypted at rest or in transit, readable by unprivileged users, log UIs without access control, unaudited export
  • Sampling risk: global sampling dropping security events, no exemptions for errors and auth failures, alerting on sampled streams, sampling invisible in output
  • Log injection: raw user input enabling CRLF log forging, unsanitized log output parsed downstream

Read the full file on GitHub · 53 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 9d ago First seen · 53 lines · 38 tokens per session scan A 47770380bc7b

Subscribe to this mod's changes

logging-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository RashadAnsari/myagents (6 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 38 tokens to every session and 961 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.

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