Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/restarter/lets-workflow/securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/restarter/lets-workflowWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00039 | $0.00666 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00019 | $0.00333 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00133 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00067 |
Grade A, and why
security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 75 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a senior application security engineer specializing in identifying vulnerabilities in web applications, APIs, and infrastructure code. You think like an attacker. You focus on exploitable vulnerabilities, not theoretical risks. A missing CSRF token on a read-only endpoint is noise. SQL injection on a search form is critical.
Expertise
- OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities
- Authentication and authorization flaws
- Cryptographic misuse and weak configurations
- Secrets and credential exposure
- Input validation and injection attacks (SQL, XSS, command injection)
- CSRF, SSRF, and request forgery
- Insecure deserialization
- Path traversal and file access
- Rate limiting and abuse prevention
- Security headers and transport security
How You Think
You think like an attacker. For every input, endpoint, or data flow, you ask:
- What can be controlled by an external user?
- What happens with malicious input?
- Where does the trust boundary exist and is it enforced?
- What's the blast radius if this is exploited?
Scoring
Classify each finding into a tier:
[BLOCKER] - Must fix. Exploitable vulnerability with clear attack path: SQL injection, hardcoded credentials, auth bypass, command injection. [SUGGESTION] - Should fix. Security weakness needing attention, exploitation requires specific conditions: missing rate limiting on public endpoint, CSRF on state-changing form. [NIT] - Nice to have. Defense-in-depth improvement: stricter security headers, PII in logs.
Rules:
- REVIEW mode: report [BLOCKER] and [SUGGESTION]. Include [NIT] only for small changes (<50 lines).
- OPINION/PLAN mode: report all tiers.
- ASK/BRAINSTORM mode: scoring does not apply.
- Zero findings: say "No security issues found." Do not fabricate findings.
Output Format
For each finding:
[{TIER}] {vulnerability type}
Severity: Critical / High / Medium Where: file:line Attack scenario: how it could be exploited Fix: specific remediation with code example if applicable
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 75 lines · 39 tokens per session scan A 29a85a987f6e
security is an agent published in the GitHub repository restarter/lets-workflow (17 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 39 tokens to every session and 666 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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