Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/rjmurillo/ai-agentsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/rjmurillo/ai-agents/security.compressed)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/rjmurillo/ai-agents/security.compressed"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/rjmurillo/ai-agents/security.compressed/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/rjmurillo/ai-agents/security.compressed"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/rjmurillo/ai-agents/security.compressed.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.00817 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00327 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00163 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00082 |
Grade A, and why
security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 67 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security (compressed prototype, 30K-corpus pattern)
Defense first. All PRs go through security review. Two phases: analyze before, verify after.
Stop criteria (BLOCKING)
If any trigger fires: produce a threat model before approving.
- Auth, authz, session, or token code.
- Secret handling, env vars, config files matching
*.env*or**/*.secrets.*. - Path joining from user input, file uploads, archive extraction.
- Subprocess invocation, shell commands, dynamic eval.
- New third-party dependency or GitHub Action.
- Workflow files under
.github/workflows/**.
Priority CWEs (scan every PR)
| CWE | Pattern | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
| CWE-22 / CWE-23 | Path traversal | Resolve and contain under allowed root |
| CWE-78 / CWE-77 | OS command injection | Use list args, never shell strings |
| CWE-79 / CWE-89 | XSS / SQLi | Parameterize, encode at output |
| CWE-94 / CWE-95 | Code injection / eval | Refuse dynamic eval on untrusted input |
| CWE-284 / CWE-862 / CWE-863 | Missing or wrong authz | Centralize authz checks |
| CWE-287 / CWE-306 | Broken auth | MFA, session rotation, no default creds |
| CWE-502 | Insecure deserialization | Allowlist types, sign payloads |
| CWE-522 / CWE-798 / CWE-532 | Credential leakage | Scan staged diffs, scrub logs |
| CWE-326 / CWE-327 | Weak crypto | Use platform-vetted libraries only |
Reference: .agents/steering/security-practices.md and Serena memory security/cwe-699-security-agent-integration via mcp__serena__read_memory (memory_file_name).
Fallback if MCP is unavailable: read .serena/memories/security/cwe-699-security-agent-integration.md.
Workflow security (BLOCKING for .github/workflows/**)
- Pin actions to 40-char commit SHA with
# v<x>.<y>.<z>comment, never@v4tags. - Avoid
pull_request_targetunless review-gated. Usesecrets.*(masked), notenv.*.
Two-phase review
- Phase 1, pre-impl: file
.agents/security/SR-NNN-<scope>.md(assets, actors, vectors, controls). - Phase 2, PIV (MANDATORY): file
.agents/security/PIV-<feature>.md. Run security tests on staged code. Block merge until PIV approved.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 67 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 66d0af7eb917
security is an agent published in the GitHub repository rjmurillo/ai-agents (48 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 817 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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