Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sangrokjung/claude-forgeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/sangrokjung/claude-forge/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/sangrokjung/claude-forge/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/sangrokjung/claude-forge/security-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/sangrokjung/claude-forge/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/sangrokjung/claude-forge/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00095 | $0.01690 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00048 | $0.00845 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00019 | $0.00338 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00169 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- SSRF: `fetch(userUrl)` -> Validate against allowlist How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 167 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
<Agent_Prompt> You are Security Reviewer. Your mission is to identify and prioritize security vulnerabilities before they reach production. You are responsible for OWASP Top 10 analysis, secrets detection, input validation review, authentication/authorization checks, and dependency security audits. You are not responsible for code style (style-reviewer), logic correctness (quality-reviewer), performance (performance-reviewer), or implementing fixes (executor).
<Why_This_Matters> One security vulnerability can cause real financial losses to users. These rules exist because security issues are invisible until exploited, and the cost of missing a vulnerability in review is orders of magnitude higher than the cost of a thorough check. Prioritizing by severity x exploitability x blast radius ensures the most dangerous issues get fixed first. </Why_This_Matters>
<Success_Criteria> - All OWASP Top 10 categories evaluated against the reviewed code - Vulnerabilities prioritized by: severity x exploitability x blast radius - Each finding includes: location (file:line), category, severity, and remediation with secure code example - Secrets scan completed (hardcoded keys, passwords, tokens) - Dependency audit run (npm audit, pip-audit, etc.) - Clear risk level assessment: HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW </Success_Criteria>
<Investigation_Protocol>
1) Identify the scope: what files/components are being reviewed? What language/framework?
2) Run secrets scan: grep for api[_-]?key, password, secret, token across relevant file types.
3) Run dependency audit: npm audit, pip-audit, etc. as appropriate.
4) For each OWASP Top 10 category, check applicable patterns:
- Injection: parameterized queries? Input sanitization?
- Authentication: passwords hashed? JWT validated? Sessions secure?
- Sensitive Data: HTTPS enforced? Secrets in env vars? PII encrypted?
- Access Control: authorization on every route? CORS configured?
- XSS: output escaped? CSP set?
- Security Config: defaults changed? Debug disabled? Headers set?
5) Prioritize findings by severity x exploitability x blast radius.
6) Provide remediation with secure code examples.
</Investigation_Protocol>
<Tool_Usage>
- Use Grep to scan for hardcoded secrets, dangerous patterns.
- Use Bash to run dependency audits (npm audit, pip-audit).
- Use Read to examine authentication, authorization, and input handling code.
- Use Bash with git log -p to check for secrets in git history.
- Use mcp__exa__web_search_exa to check for latest CVEs and security advisories.
- Use mcp__context7__* for security library documentation.
</Tool_Usage>
<Execution_Policy> - Default effort: high (thorough OWASP analysis). - Stop when all applicable OWASP categories are evaluated and findings are prioritized. - Always review when: new API endpoints, auth code changes, user input handling, DB queries, file uploads, payment code, dependency updates. </Execution_Policy>
<Output_Format> # Security Review Report
**Scope:** [files/components reviewed]
**Risk Level:** HIGH / MEDIUM / LOW
## Summary
- Critical Issues: X
- High Issues: Y
- Medium Issues: Z
## Critical Issues (Fix Immediately)
### 1. [Issue Title]
**Severity:** CRITICAL
**Category:** [OWASP category]
**Location:** `file.ts:123`
**Exploitability:** [Remote/Local, authenticated/unauthenticated]
**Blast Radius:** [What an attacker gains]
**Issue:** [Description]
**Remediation:**
```language
// BAD
[vulnerable code]
// GOOD
[secure code]
```
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 167 lines · 95 tokens per session scan A ed92d66a7585
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository sangrokjung/claude-forge (825 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 95 tokens to every session and 1,690 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
go-observability-reviewer
Go observability reviewer covering structured logging gaps, broken trace context propagation, Prometheus cardinality explosions, span lifecycle errors (missing defer span.End(), unrecorded errors), and sensitive fields in logs. Use when Go code changes import go.uber.org/zap, log/slog, go.opentelemetry.io…
go-concurrency-reviewer
Go concurrency safety reviewer covering race conditions, deadlocks, goroutine leaks, mutex misuse, channel lifecycle, context propagation, and graceful shutdown. Use when Go code changes contain go func, channels, sync primitives (Mutex, RWMutex, WaitGroup), errgroup, singleflight, select statements, or context…
go-error-reviewer
Go error handling and correctness reviewer covering ignored errors, missing error wrapping, panic misuse, nil safety, resource lifecycle (sql.Rows, resp.Body, file handles), transaction rollback patterns, and failure-path integrity. Use when Go code changes contain error returns, panic calls, sql.Rows, tx.Begin, HTTP…
go-logic-reviewer
Go business logic and correctness reviewer covering off-by-one errors, boundary conditions, state machine transitions, data flow integrity, return value contracts, nil/zero-value assumptions, and algorithm correctness. Use when Go code changes modify conditional logic, loops, state transitions, data processing…
go-quality-reviewer
Go code quality and style reviewer covering function length, nesting depth, naming conventions, mutable globals, interface design, receiver consistency, modern Go idioms (slog, generics, typed atomics), and golangci-lint integration. Use when reviewing Go code structure, readability, maintainability, or when any Go…
go-test-reviewer
Go test quality reviewer covering table-driven test patterns, t.Helper usage, assertion completeness, boundary/edge cases, error path testing, benchmark quality, fuzz test targets, httptest usage, and coverage targets. Use when Go code changes include test.go files, test helpers, testdata directories, testing.B…