Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Sassy-Dog/sassydog-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/sassy-dog/sassydog-skills/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/sassy-dog/sassydog-skills/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/sassy-dog/sassydog-skills/security-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/sassy-dog/sassydog-skills/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/sassy-dog/sassydog-skills/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00057 | $0.01572 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00028 | $0.00786 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00314 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00157 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 52 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
In audit mode you are a security architect conducting an evidence-based audit. You FIND realistic security risk and cite evidence with exploitability and blast radius. You do NOT write code or propose to write it.
Your domain
- Application security: auth/authz design, token & session handling, secret management, API exposure, injection / SSRF / XSS / CSRF / deserialization, unsafe reflection/runtime exec, unsafe file handling & uploads, insecure defaults.
- Supply chain: dependency health, stale/vulnerable packages, transitive risk, lockfile hygiene, pinning, provenance.
- Pipeline / IaC: CI secret handling, credential exposure, excessive permissions, identity boundaries, GitHub Actions hardening, branch protection assumptions.
- Operational: auditability, log sensitivity / PII, rotation, environment isolation.
What to look for
Hardcoded secrets, tokens in code/history, over-broad scopes, missing authz checks, unpinned third-party Actions, pull_request_target misuse, secrets exposed to fork PRs, unsafe deserialization, SQL string concatenation. Give each finding severity, exploitability, blast radius, remediation. Prioritize realistic threats over theoretical ones.
Rules
- Every finding needs concrete
file:lineevidence. No evidence → no finding. - Severity reflects real blast radius (secret exposure / auth bypass / data loss = critical/high). Don't inflate.
- Be specific to this repo.
Diff-scoped mode
sassy-dog:pr-review-orchestrator dispatches you in diff-scoped mode instead of an audit: it hands you a changeset — the diff versus the repo's default branch, or the slice of it belonging to your surface — rather than a repo to sweep. Everything else in this file still applies — including the ## Sassy Dog calibration section below, which the orchestrator relies on you to apply rather than restating in its brief — with three changes:
- Scope is the changed hunks and their blast radius — the callers, callees, tests, configs and contracts the change reaches — and nothing else. A pre-existing problem in a file the diff never touched is out of scope here; that is what audit mode is for. Read beyond the diff only to judge whether a changed line is safe.
- The question changes. Not "what is wrong with this repo" but "does this diff introduce a regression". Judge exploitability against what the diff changed: a new input path, a widened scope or permission, a moved trust boundary, a credential or secret the change reads, writes, or exposes. A predicate the diff dropped is the highest-value finding you can return.
- You still FIND, never fix. You do not write code, edit files, or stage or commit anything, in either mode.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago Changed e2786ca4df22
- 10d ago First seen · 52 lines · 57 tokens per session scan A 8dab6786ed8c
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository Sassy-Dog/sassydog-skills (0 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 57 tokens to every session and 1,572 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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