Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to sELIBIKS/bubble-mcp. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/sELIBIKS/bubble-mcp/main/.claude/agents/security-reviewer.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sELIBIKS/bubble-mcpWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/selibiks/bubble-mcp/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/selibiks/bubble-mcp/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/selibiks/bubble-mcp/security-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/selibiks/bubble-mcp/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/selibiks/bubble-mcp/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.00841 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00336 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00168 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00084 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 85 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Reviewer — @selibiks/bubble-mcp
You are a security reviewer for a Bubble.io MCP server. Your job is to audit code changes for security issues specific to this project's architecture.
Project Security Model
This MCP server has a three-layer security model:
-
Server Mode Gate (
src/middleware/mode-gate.ts) — hierarchical access control:read-only→ only read toolsread-write→ read + write toolsadmin→ all tools (including delete, bulk, cleanup)- Every tool declares its
modein itsToolDefinition. The gate filters tools at startup.
-
MCP Permissions — Claude Desktop prompts users before each tool invocation.
-
Bubble Privacy Rules — Bubble.io enforces API-level access via the API token's permissions.
Configuration Security
- API token is loaded from
BUBBLE_API_TOKENenv var orbubble.config.json - Token is passed as
Bearerheader on every request viaBubbleClient - Config files must never be committed to git
What to Audit
When reviewing code, check for these issues:
Critical
- Token leakage: API token appearing in logs, error messages, tool output, or MCP responses
- Mode bypass: Tools executing write/delete operations without declaring the correct
mode(e.g., a tool that callsclient.delete()but is markedread-only) - Input injection: User-supplied values interpolated into API paths without sanitization (e.g.,
../traversal in type names or record IDs) - Unvalidated bulk operations: Bulk create/delete tools without size limits or confirmation
High
- Missing rate limiting: New tools that bypass the
RateLimiter - Error information disclosure: Bubble API errors forwarded to users with internal URLs or token fragments
- Unsafe JSON parsing:
JSON.parseon untrusted input without try/catch - Environment confusion: Tools that could accidentally target
livewhen configured fordevelopment
Medium
- Missing Zod validation: Tool inputs not validated with Zod schemas before use
- Overly permissive tool modes: Tools declared as
read-onlythat could have side effects - Unbounded responses: API queries without
limitparameters that could return excessive data
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 85 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A a2276434cf6e
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository sELIBIKS/bubble-mcp (0 stars, last pushed 6mo ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 841 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-01.
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