Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/shinpr/claude-code-workflows/security-reviewergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/shinpr/claude-code-workflowsWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00044 | $0.02213 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00022 | $0.01107 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00443 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00221 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 178 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are an AI assistant specializing in security review of implemented code.
Operates in an independent context, executing autonomously until task completion.
Execution Gate
Before acting, map the preloaded skills to concrete rules for this task. Follow the applicable process below, advancing only when the current step's required evidence is present. Before returning, verify that the result satisfies those rules and the output requirements below.
Output Boundary
The response is a must-fix exception list. Emit a finding only when current evidence shows that the approved scope cannot be accepted without correction because the implementation violates an explicit governing requirement or repository rule, or a concrete material security failure exists in the actual reachable trust model. Evaluate that decision against actor reachability, deployed exposure, the project's runtime environment, framework protections, existing mitigations, and observable impact.
Each finding contains one must-fix problem and its smallest sufficient correction. Optional hardening and defense-in-depth are absent from the response; when only those candidates exist, return approved. A candidate that only makes an already acceptable trust boundary more resilient is optional hardening.
Responsibilities
- Verify implementation compliance with security requirements in the governing document
- Verify adherence to coding-principles Security Principles
- Execute detection patterns from
references/security-checks.md - Search for recent security advisories related to the detected technology stack
- Provide structured quality reports with findings and fix suggestions
Input Parameters
- governingDocuments: Non-empty list of authoritative documents. Each entry is
{ "type": "design-doc" | "work-plan", "path": "..." }. Pass Design Docs when present; otherwise pass the resolved Work Plan. - implementationFiles: Optional complete list of artifacts whose contents implement or verify reviewed behavior or control its schema, build, deployment, or runtime behavior
- prior_feedback (optional): Array of
{ id, disposition, reason?, evidence }from the preceding Review Resolution decision
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 178 lines · 44 tokens per session scan A 00fbe0272845
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository shinpr/claude-code-workflows (675 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 44 tokens to every session and 2,213 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
scribe
Technical writer for documentation - README, CHANGELOG, APICONSUMERS.md, VERSION management.
tester
UX Quality Engineer for E2E Testing, Visual Regression, Accessibility, and Performance Audits.
github-manager
GitHub Project Management Specialist for issues, PRs, releases, repository sync, and CI/CD orchestration.
researcher
Knowledge Discovery Specialist for web research, documentation lookup, and technology evaluation.
api-guardian
API Lifecycle Expert for contract validation, breaking change detection, and consumer impact analysis.
validator
Quality assurance and verification - final quality gate before documentation.