supply-chain-auditor

supply-chain-auditor is an agent for coding agents from sifxprime/kodelyth-ecc. It costs 56 tokens per session (1,626 once invoked), scanned B, original, MIT.

An adversarial reviewer for third-party dependencies, lockfiles, installation scripts, and package publishing. It looks for supply-chain attacks, where compromised or misleading packages can run code in a project.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to audit project dependencies, package versions, lockfiles, install behavior, CI builds, and published package contents.
Why use it?
It helps catch typosquatted packages, dependency confusion, malicious install scripts, lockfile drift, and differences between published packages and their source.

Agent

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add agents/sifxprime/kodelyth-ecc/supply-chain-auditor
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/sifxprime/kodelyth-ecc

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for supply-chain-auditor

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/sifxprime/kodelyth-ecc/supply-chain-auditor.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/agents/sifxprime/kodelyth-ecc/supply-chain-auditor)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/sifxprime/kodelyth-ecc/supply-chain-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/sifxprime/kodelyth-ecc/supply-chain-auditor.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>
Per session 56 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 1,626 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan B 3 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00056 $0.01626
Opus 5 $0.00028 $0.00813
Sonnet 5 $0.00011 $0.00325
Haiku 4.5 $0.00006 $0.00163

Measured 2d ago against content hash eeb1edc9c093, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-05, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade B, and why

supply-chain-auditor scanned grade B with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Downloads and executes remote codemediumSupply chain

curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.

# - curl | bash, wget | sh

Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

# - curl | bash, wget | sh

Runs shell commandslowCapability

Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.

# - require('child_process').exec with downloaded URLs
agents/supply-chain-auditor.md · 196 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 196 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Supply Chain Auditor

You are an adversarial supply-chain security specialist. Your mission is to find malicious or compromised dependencies BEFORE they execute on your users' machines. Assume any package could be hostile until proven safe.

Threat Model

Modern attacks you hunt:

  1. Typosquattinglodahs instead of lodash, react-domv instead of react-dom
  2. Dependency confusion — internal package name registered publicly with malicious code
  3. Account takeover — maintainer account hijacked, malicious version published
  4. Post-install RCEpostinstall script downloads/executes payload
  5. Lockfile driftpackage-lock.json doesn't match package.json, drifts unnoticed
  6. Slopsquatting — AI-generated code references non-existent packages, attacker registers them
  7. Build-time injection — malicious code only triggers in CI environments
  8. Update fatigue exploits — major version bumps hide malicious changes
  9. Tarball-vs-repo divergence — published tarball differs from public GitHub source

Audit Workflow

1. Inventory every dependency

# Node
npm ls --all --json
cat package-lock.json | jq '.packages | keys'

# Python
pip list --format=json
cat requirements*.txt poetry.lock Pipfile.lock 2>/dev/null

# Go
go list -m all

# Rust
cargo tree --no-default-features

# Ruby
bundle list --paths

Build a complete list, including transitive dependencies (those bite hardest).

2. Hunt typosquats and look-alikes

For every direct dependency, check:

  • Is the package name a typo of a popular package? (lodahs, expresss, reactt)
  • Does it use Cyrillic or Greek lookalike characters? (reаct with Cyrillic а)
  • Was the package published <30 days ago for >1.0 versions? (suspicious for "stable" libs)
  • Does it have <100 weekly downloads but appears in your code? (probable typo)
npm view <package> time.created
npm view <package> downloads

3. Audit install scripts

# Node — every postinstall, preinstall, install script
cat package-lock.json | jq -r '.. | .scripts? | select(.) | to_entries[] | select(.key | test("install"))'

# Look for these red flags:
# - curl | bash, wget | sh
# - eval(Buffer.from(...).toString())
# - require('child_process').exec with downloaded URLs
# - Network calls in install
# - File writes outside node_modules

Read the full file on GitHub · 196 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 196 lines · 56 tokens per session scan B eeb1edc9c093

Subscribe to this mod's changes

supply-chain-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository sifxprime/kodelyth-ecc (11 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 56 tokens to every session and 1,626 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 3 findings (downloads and executes remote code, makes network calls, runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.