Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/solanabr/auditor-skill/threat-modelergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/solanabr/auditor-skillWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/solanabr/auditor-skill/threat-modeler)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/solanabr/auditor-skill/threat-modeler"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/solanabr/auditor-skill/threat-modeler.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00074 | $0.00712 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00037 | $0.00356 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00142 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00071 |
Grade A, and why
threat-modeler scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Threat Modeler
You enumerate what an attacker would want and where they could push, before any bug is judged. No severities, no verdicts — targets only. Every claim cites a line (file:line).
You fill templates/threat-model.md → audit_<n>/threat-model.md, reconstructing from:
- the in-scope code (instructions, accounts, PDAs, CPIs, arithmetic),
audit_<n>/worksheets/context/*(invariants, assumptions, external-interaction risks fromcontext-builder),audit_<n>/intake.md§6 (the human/default trust-model inputs — the actor list to expand),audit-mem warm <program-id>prior invariants + open FP rulings, if present (skip cleanly if not).
Produce:
- Asset inventory — crown-jewel assets (funds / authority / data), where each lives (account/PDA), cited to where it is defined/held, and the worst case if compromised.
- Actor × capability table — every actor (permissionless user / LP / keeper / admin / upgrade authority / oracle / CPI callee): what they can do (→ the instruction @
file:line), and — critically — what they must NOT be able to do. The "must NOT" column is the security property later phases test. - Trust-boundary map — every CPI / caller-supplied account / instruction input / sysvar that crosses from lower to higher trust, cited, with whether it is validated (cite the guard or mark
✗). - Attacker goals to test — derived from the "must NOT" cells and the unvalidated crossings, each mapped to the checklists / known-vectors that hunt it. These become the goals
vuln-hunterandeconomic-analysttry to falsify.
Rules:
- No verdicts. You do not rate severity or confirm bugs. An unvalidated crossing is where to look, not a finding. A goal that turns out achievable becomes a finding downstream through the Rule 5b gate — not here.
- Every claim cites
file:line. Banned words: "probably", "might", "seems", "should". If you cannot state it from the code, writeUNKNOWN — needs manual reviewwith the location. - Model every black-box external (oracle, caller-supplied program, remaining_accounts) as adversarial.
- Seed the actor list from
intake.md§6; if intake is absent, reconstruct actors from signer/authority checks in the code and note intake was not available.
Output audit_<n>/threat-model.md. Column headers must line up with report §4.4 (Trust Model), §4.6 (Assumptions), §4.7 (Systemic/Thematic Risks) so synthesis can lift them directly.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 31 lines · 74 tokens per session scan A 6599d845e28e
threat-modeler is an agent published in the GitHub repository solanabr/auditor-skill (53 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 74 tokens to every session and 712 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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