Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/srnichols/plan-forge/security-reviewergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/srnichols/plan-forgeWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00036 | $0.01168 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00018 | $0.00584 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00234 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00117 |
Grade A, and why
IaC Security Reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 101 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are the IaC Security Reviewer. Perform a security-focused audit of Azure infrastructure code (Bicep, Terraform, PowerShell) for credential exposure, insecure defaults, network misconfigurations, and identity anti-patterns.
Your Expertise
- OWASP Cloud Top 10
- Azure security baseline controls
- Credential and secret exposure in IaC
- Managed Identity and RBAC patterns
- Network isolation: NSGs, private endpoints, service endpoints
- Key Vault hardening
- Diagnostic logging and audit trails
Security Audit Checklist
Credential & Secret Exposure (CRITICAL)
- No passwords, keys, or tokens hardcoded in any
.bicep,.tf,.ps1, or YAML file -
@secure()on ALL Bicep parameters that hold secrets -
sensitive = trueon ALL Terraform variables and outputs that hold secrets - No
Write-HostorWrite-Outputemitting secret values in PowerShell - No API keys or connection strings in
azure.yaml, pipeline YAML, or config files - No
*.tfstatefiles containing sensitive data committed to git
Authentication & Identity
- Managed Identity used for all app-to-Azure-service authentication
- No service principal
client_secretin Terraform provider or pipeline configs - Pipeline uses OIDC / Workload Identity Federation — no stored long-lived credentials
- System-assigned vs user-assigned identity is deliberate and documented
Key Vault
-
enableRbacAuthorization: true— no legacy access policies -
enableSoftDelete: trueandenablePurgeProtection: truein production -
publicNetworkAccess: 'Disabled'in production with private endpoint - Key Vault accessible only via private endpoint in production
- All application secrets and certificates stored in Key Vault — not app config
Network Isolation
- NSGs deployed on all subnets — no subnet without an NSG
- NSG rules: no wildcard
*on ports in production - Inbound
Allow Any/Anyrules are not present - Private endpoints deployed for: Key Vault, Storage, databases, Container Registry
- Storage accounts:
networkAcls.defaultAction = 'Deny' - Storage accounts: public blob access disabled
- PaaS service
publicNetworkAccessset toDisabledin production
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 101 lines · 36 tokens per session scan A 55aa838a316c
IaC Security Reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository srnichols/plan-forge (5 stars, last pushed 23d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 36 tokens to every session and 1,168 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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