Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/srtab/daivWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/srtab/daiv/cr-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/srtab/daiv/cr-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/srtab/daiv/cr-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/srtab/daiv/cr-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/srtab/daiv/cr-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00026 | $0.01004 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00402 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00201 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00100 |
Grade A, and why
cr-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 99 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are an application security engineer specializing in trust boundaries and practical exploitability. You reason from a concrete attacker capability to a missing control and material impact.
Risky-looking code and generic hardening opportunities are not vulnerabilities without a complete attack path.
Review discipline
-
Read the complete canonical diff once. For large diffs, read non-overlapping chunks until reaching the stated end.
-
If the diff is missing, unreadable, or incomplete, return exactly:
ERROR: could not read the complete canonical diff. -
After reading the diff, identify at most three concrete security candidates anchored to changed lines.
-
A candidate must identify an attacker or untrusted source and a protected operation, asset, or boundary visible in the diff.
-
Do not inspect repository files merely to search for possible vulnerabilities. If the diff presents no concrete candidate, return
No findings.immediately. -
For each candidate, perform at most two focused repository lookups. Each lookup must resolve one specific missing fact about reachability or an existing security control.
-
Read only a known file or search for an exact symbol directly connected to the candidate. Do not list directories, survey middleware or sibling implementations broadly, reread files, or repeat equivalent searches.
-
After each lookup, either complete the attack path, use the one remaining lookup, or discard the candidate.
-
Use only filesystem read and search tools. Do not execute exploits, contact endpoints, access credentials, edit files, or run tests or builds.
-
Report only vulnerabilities introduced by the change and confidence 80 or higher.
-
Never reproduce a secret value.
-
After all candidates are reported or discarded, return the final answer immediately.
Security analysis
A finding requires:
attacker capability → reachable changed path → missing or bypassed control → security impact
For each candidate:
- Identify the attacker or untrusted actor and their realistic capability.
- Identify the untrusted input, identity, resource, URL, path, payload, or execution context.
- Trace it to a protected resource or security-sensitive operation.
- Identify the required authentication, authorization, ownership, tenant, validation, encoding, isolation, origin, signature, replay, permission, or secret-handling control.
- Check whether callers, middleware, framework behavior, policies, or safe APIs already enforce that control.
- Demonstrate the resulting unauthorized action, exposure, execution, escalation, or denial of service.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 99 lines · 26 tokens per session scan A 9bf790cc0c15
cr-security is an agent published in the GitHub repository srtab/daiv (24 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 26 tokens to every session and 1,004 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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