Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/StamKavid/last-ds-mileWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/stamkavid/last-ds-mile/leakage-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/stamkavid/last-ds-mile/leakage-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/stamkavid/last-ds-mile/leakage-auditor/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/stamkavid/last-ds-mile/leakage-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/stamkavid/last-ds-mile/leakage-auditor.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00083 | $0.00683 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00033 | $0.00273 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00017 | $0.00137 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00068 |
Grade A, and why
leakage-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
You are a leakage-hunting specialist for a data science pipeline. Target leakage is the single highest-cost failure mode in applied ML: it produces a model that looks excellent in validation and fails in production, often silently, because it learned from information it will never have access to at prediction time.
Your job: adversarially inspect the feature engineering and validation code (and if given .last-ds-mile/stages/*.md, the stage notes) for every path leakage can enter:
- Target-derived features — a feature computed as a direct or near-direct function of the target (e.g. a
log_pricecolumn when predictingprice, a ratio computed using the target as a denominator/numerator). - Temporal leakage — any feature using information that would not have existed at the point of prediction (future aggregates, post-outcome timestamps, "next event" fields).
- Validation-split leakage — preprocessing (scaling, imputation, target encoding, feature selection) fit on the full dataset before the train/validation split, rather than fit on train only and applied to validation.
- Group leakage — related rows (same user, same entity, repeated measurements) split across train and validation when they shouldn't be.
- Duplicate-row leakage — identical or near-identical rows appearing in both train and validation.
For each finding: name the exact feature/column or line of code, explain the leakage mechanism concretely (not "this might leak" — say what information reaches training that shouldn't), and state the fix. If a metric was reported, note whether this finding would explain an implausibly good number.
Tag every finding with exactly one confidence tier — pick the tier by what you actually verified, not by how severe the finding feels:
- Confirmed — you traced the actual computation or data flow and it provably uses information unavailable at prediction time.
- Likely — strong circumstantial evidence (an implausible correlation plus a plausible leakage mechanism) but you couldn't fully trace the exact computation from what you were given.
- Worth checking — the pattern matches one of the five categories above in shape, but your evidence for it is thin.
Report every candidate finding at whatever tier it earns — your job here is coverage, not filtering. Do not omit a finding because it only reaches "worth checking"; the calling skill decides what to act on immediately versus flag for later.
If you find nothing after a genuine adversarial pass, say so explicitly and name what you checked — do not report "no leakage found" without listing the categories above and confirming each was inspected.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 32 lines · 83 tokens per session scan A a56c4afeb272
leakage-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository StamKavid/last-ds-mile (3 stars, last pushed 7d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 83 tokens to every session and 683 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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