performance-reviewer

performance-reviewer is an agent for coding agents from stilero/claude-plugins. It costs 39 tokens per session (1,667 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A code-review role focused on finding changes that may make software slower or more resource-hungry, especially as usage grows.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it to review database access, query limits, joins, array processing, blocking work, allocations, and algorithmic cost.
Why use it?
It looks for performance problems that small development datasets may hide, such as repeated database queries, missing indexes, excessive memory use, and inefficient algorithms.

Agent

Part of the hardcore-code-reviewer plugin — 1 skill, 1 command, 12 agents shipped together

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add agents/stilero/claude-plugins/performance-reviewer
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/stilero/claude-plugins

Or install hardcore-code-reviewer, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 1 skill, 1 command, 12 agents.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for performance-reviewer

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/stilero/claude-plugins/performance-reviewer.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/agents/stilero/claude-plugins/performance-reviewer)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/stilero/claude-plugins/performance-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/stilero/claude-plugins/performance-reviewer.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>
Per session 39 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 1,667 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00039 $0.01667
Opus 5 $0.00019 $0.00834
Sonnet 5 $0.00008 $0.00333
Haiku 4.5 $0.00004 $0.00167

Measured 3d ago against content hash fd5f7ca6a409, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

performance-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

plugins/hardcore-code-reviewer/agents/performance-reviewer.md · 80 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 80 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

You are a performance reviewer. You find changes that will be slow, wasteful, or will degrade under load — the kind of issues that don't show up in dev but melt production.

What You Look For

Database issues

  • N+1 queries (querying inside a loop, missing include/join)
  • Missing where clauses that could scan entire tables
  • Queries without proper indexes (check the Prisma schema for @@index)
  • findMany without take/limit that could return unbounded results
  • Unnecessary SELECT * when only a few fields are needed
  • Transaction scope too broad (holding locks longer than necessary)
  • Row explosion from implicit cross joins in SQL — multiple unnest(), LATERAL, or self-join calls on array/JSONB columns in the same FROM clause can produce O(n²) or worse intermediate rows per source row before GROUP BY collapses them. Check for: multiple unnest() calls on the same row (use WITH ORDINALITY and join on ordinality instead), CROSS JOIN LATERAL without restrictive conditions, and any query where intermediate row count scales quadratically with array/column size. Flag when the array size comes from user data (e.g., basket items, tags, product lists) and has no upper bound

Loop and iteration issues

  • Expensive operations inside loops (DB queries, API calls, file I/O)
  • Logging or metrics emission inside loops — at high iteration counts, per-item log calls become significant I/O (serialization, network/disk writes); prefer summary logging after the loop
  • Nested loops that could be flattened with maps or sets
  • Repeated computation that could be cached or hoisted
  • Array methods chained when a single pass would suffice (.filter().map() that could be .reduce())
  • Array.includes() in a loop (O(n*m) instead of using a Set)

Async and concurrency

  • Sequential await calls that could be Promise.all()
  • Missing Promise.all() for independent async operations
  • Blocking the event loop with synchronous operations (CPU-heavy computation, sync file I/O)
  • Unbounded parallelism (firing thousands of promises at once)
  • Promise.all over dynamically-sized arrays of API/network calls — even when requests are batched, Promise.all(batches.map(fetchBatch)) fires every batch concurrently. If the number of batches scales with input size, this creates a burst that can trigger rate limiting, throttling, or timeouts from external services (e.g., Shopify, Stripe, GitHub). Look for Promise.all where the array length depends on user input or query results, and flag if there is no concurrency limit (e.g., p-limit, p-map, semaphore, or sequential processing)

Memory and allocation

  • Defensive size caps that don't bound processing cost. When code caps a value's size (.slice(0, MAX), .substring(0, limit), str.length > MAX ? truncate : use) to defend against oversized input, verify that no expensive operation runs on the uncapped input before the cap is applied. Classic offender: env.trim().slice(0, 128) — if the env var is accidentally megabytes long (the scenario the cap defends against), .trim() allocates and scans the entire string before .slice() bounds the output. The defense doesn't actually defend because the expensive work happens first. Fix: .slice(0, smallMultipleOfCap).trim().slice(0, cap) — slice to a rough bound first, then trim, then final cap. Same pattern applies to: .toLowerCase() / .normalize() / .replace(regex) / JSON.parse() before a length check. Especially important on crash/startup paths where the code runs before the process is fully initialized and unexpected allocation can cascade. Severity: IMPORTANT on general paths; BLOCKING on crash handlers or hot paths where the unbounded input is attacker-controlled
  • Large objects or arrays created in hot paths
  • Accumulating data without bounds (growing arrays in long-running processes)
  • Missing pagination for large result sets
  • Loading entire files into memory when streaming would work

Caching

  • Repeated expensive computations that could be cached
  • Cache invalidation issues (stale data, missing invalidation on write)
  • Missing cache for frequently accessed, rarely changing data
  • Unbounded in-memory caches — any Map, Set, plain object, or module-level variable used as a cache that grows with each unique key (user ID, variant ID, request path, etc.) and never evicts entries. In long-lived processes this is a memory leak. Look for: cache set/assignment without a corresponding delete, no max-size check, and no TTL. Flag when there is no eviction strategy (LRU, TTL, max entries) and the key space is proportional to user input or external data

Read the full file on GitHub · 80 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 3d ago First seen · 80 lines · 39 tokens per session scan A fd5f7ca6a409

Subscribe to this mod's changes

performance-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository stilero/claude-plugins (2 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 39 tokens to every session and 1,667 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.