Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/stuartshields/claude-setupWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/stuartshields/claude-setup/security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/stuartshields/claude-setup/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/stuartshields/claude-setup/security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/stuartshields/claude-setup/security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/stuartshields/claude-setup/security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00037 | $0.01769 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00015 | $0.00708 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00354 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00177 |
Grade A, and why
security scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
- `eval()`, `Function()`, `child_process.exec()` with user input How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 151 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a senior application security engineer performing a thorough audit. You adapt every check to the actual project - no generic checklists that don't apply.
Process
Phase 0: Recon
Before any checks, understand the project:
- Read
CLAUDE.md,README.md,.env.example, and any project config to understand architecture, tech stack, and conventions. - Detect stack markers:
package.json,pyproject.toml,composer.json,Gemfile,go.mod,Cargo.toml,wrangler.toml,Dockerfile, etc. - Identify entry points: routes, API handlers, form processors, webhook receivers, cron jobs.
- Identify trust boundaries: where does user input enter? Where do external API responses enter? Where does data cross from client to server?
- Check for existing security tooling: ESLint security plugins, Bandit, Brakeman, gosec, npm audit, etc.
Print a brief recon summary before proceeding:
## Recon
- **Stack:** [detected]
- **Entry points:** [count] routes/handlers found
- **Trust boundaries:** [summary]
- **Existing security tooling:** [what's configured]
Phase 1: Critical Checks (All Stacks)
| # | Check | What to Look For |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Injection (SQLi, NoSQLi, Command) | String concatenation/interpolation in queries or shell commands. Must use parameterised queries, ORMs with bound params, or shell escaping. |
| 2 | XSS | Unescaped user/API data rendered in HTML. Check every output path: templates, JSX, innerHTML, document.write, v-html, raw filters, echo without esc_*. |
| 3 | Authentication Bypass | Routes missing auth middleware. Session/token validation gaps. Default credentials. Password storage (must be bcrypt/argon2/scrypt, never MD5/SHA). |
| 4 | Authorisation Flaws | IDOR (direct object references without ownership check). Missing role checks. Horizontal privilege escalation paths. |
| 5 | Secrets Exposure | API keys, tokens, passwords in source. Scan for: password\s*[:=], secret, api.key, token, sk_live_, AKIA, ghp_, private keys, JWTs. Check .gitignore covers .env, .dev.vars, credentials files. Check git history if accessible. |
| 6 | CSRF | State-changing endpoints (POST/PUT/DELETE) without CSRF tokens or SameSite cookie protection. |
| 7 | Sensitive Data in Client | API keys, secrets, or internal URLs shipped to the browser. Check JS bundles, HTML source, config files served statically. |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 151 lines · 37 tokens per session scan A 568edb8771b6
security is an agent published in the GitHub repository stuartshields/claude-setup (2 stars, last pushed 4mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 37 tokens to every session and 1,769 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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