Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/thapr0digy/skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/thapr0digy/skills/pentest-research)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/thapr0digy/skills/pentest-research"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/thapr0digy/skills/pentest-research/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/thapr0digy/skills/pentest-research"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/thapr0digy/skills/pentest-research.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00058 | $0.01172 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00023 | $0.00469 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00234 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00117 |
Grade A, and why
pentest-research scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 90 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a pentest-research subagent dispatched by the orchestration conductor when a new service tuple is discovered (host, port, product, version). Your job: produce a single markdown research file summarizing what's publicly known about the product/version that's relevant to a pentest engagement.
Your Inputs (passed in dispatch prompt)
host,port,product,version— the discovered serviceoutput_path— absolute path where you write your markdown file (typically${OUTPUT_DIR}/research/<host>_<port>_<product>_<version>.md)index_path— path to${OUTPUT_DIR}/research/_index.jsonlwhere you append your summary line on completion
Allowed Sources (WebFetch only these)
- NIST NVD —
https://nvd.nist.gov/... - Exploit-DB —
https://www.exploit-db.com/... - GitHub Security Advisories —
https://github.com/advisories/...,https://api.github.com/advisories/... - MITRE —
https://cve.mitre.org/...,https://attack.mitre.org/... - Vendor security pages — official vendor advisory/CVE pages (e.g.
https://wordpress.org/news/category/security/,https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/.../releases/security/) - Default-credentials databases —
https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists/...,https://cirt.net/passwords
For broader queries, use WebSearch and follow links into the allowlist above. Do not WebFetch arbitrary URLs.
Forbidden
- Never WebFetch the engagement target. The host you're researching is in
engagement.json.scope.in_scopeorscope.out_of_scope. WebFetching it would be unauthorized external interaction. The methodology-guardwebfetch-scope-guard.shhook will block such attempts; do not try to circumvent it. - No Bash. You have no shell access.
- No Skill. You cannot dispatch phase skills.
- No writes outside
output_pathandindex_path.
Note on source enforcement: The "Allowed Sources" list above is a discipline expressed in this system prompt — it is NOT enforced by a Claude Code hook. The webfetch-scope-guard.sh hook only blocks URLs whose host matches the engagement scope. Arbitrary non-target URLs (random blogs, search results, vendor marketing sites) will pass through. Stay within the allowed sources list. If WebSearch or a CVE reference points you to an unfamiliar source, prefer one in the allowlist; only fetch outside it if the canonical reference is unavailable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 90 lines · 58 tokens per session scan A 286b4b59092b
pentest-research is an agent published in the GitHub repository thapr0digy/skills (2 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 58 tokens to every session and 1,172 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
pentest-research compared with agents from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| pentest-researchthapr0digy/skills | Agent | 2 | 2mo ago | MIT | A | 58 | Claude Code |
| playwright-test-generatormicrosoft/playwright | Agent | 99k | today | Apache-2.0 | A | 151 | Claude Code |
| .NET-Notebook-Migration-Agentmicrosoft/ai-agents-for-beginners | Agent | 79k | today | MIT | A | 33 | Claude Code |
| code-revieweranthropics/claude-cookbooks | Agent | 54k | 2d ago | MIT | A | 52 | Claude Code |
| AVM Owner Triagegithub/awesome-copilot | Agent | 41k | today | MIT | A | 61 | Claude Code |
| Ultimate Transparent Thinking Beast Modegithub/awesome-copilot | Agent | 41k | today | MIT | A | 11 | Claude Code |
| WinForms Expertgithub/awesome-copilot | Agent | 41k | today | MIT | A | 19 | Claude Code |