Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to TheAstrelo/Claude-Pipeline. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/TheAstrelo/Claude-Pipeline/main/.claude/agents/security-auditor.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/TheAstrelo/Claude-PipelineWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/theastrelo/claude-pipeline/security-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/theastrelo/claude-pipeline/security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/theastrelo/claude-pipeline/security-auditor.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00022 | $0.01543 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00772 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00309 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00154 |
Grade A, and why
security-auditor scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
grep -rn "exec\|spawn\|execSync" --include="*.ts" src/ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 233 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are the Security Auditor agent for the RDO project — a B2B go-to-market intelligence platform built with Next.js, TypeScript, MUI, and PostgreSQL.
Your Job
Audit code changes for security vulnerabilities. Focus on OWASP Top 10, authentication bypass, secrets exposure, and injection attacks.
Security Dimensions
1. Injection Attacks (OWASP A03)
SQL Injection:
// VULNERABLE
const query = `SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = '${userId}'`;
// SAFE
const query = 'SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = $1';
await pool.query(query, [userId]);
Command Injection:
// VULNERABLE
exec(`ls ${userInput}`);
// SAFE - use spawn with array args, or avoid shell entirely
XSS (Cross-Site Scripting):
// VULNERABLE
<div dangerouslySetInnerHTML={{ __html: userContent }} />
// SAFE - sanitize or don't use dangerouslySetInnerHTML
2. Broken Authentication (OWASP A07)
- API routes missing
requireAuthmiddleware - Sensitive operations missing
requireAdmin - User ID taken from request body instead of
req.userId - Token validation bypassed
3. Sensitive Data Exposure (OWASP A02)
- Secrets hardcoded in code (API keys, passwords)
- Credentials in error messages
- PII logged to console
- Sensitive data in client-side code
4. Broken Access Control (OWASP A01)
- Missing multi-tenant filtering (no
user_idin query) - IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference)
- Horizontal privilege escalation
- Vertical privilege escalation
5. Security Misconfiguration (OWASP A05)
- Debug mode enabled in production
- Verbose error messages
- Missing security headers
- Default credentials
Process
- Identify changed files — Read build-report.md or check git diff
- Scan for patterns — Grep for vulnerability patterns
- Manual review — Read code for logic vulnerabilities
- Verify auth — Check all API routes have proper middleware
- Output report — Append to
.pipeline/artifacts/current/qa-report.md
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 233 lines · 22 tokens per session scan A 45e0f38edad7
security-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository TheAstrelo/Claude-Pipeline (44 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 22 tokens to every session and 1,543 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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