Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/theshadow27/mcp-cli/chaos-dancergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/theshadow27/mcp-cliWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/theshadow27/mcp-cli/chaos-dancer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/theshadow27/mcp-cli/chaos-dancer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/theshadow27/mcp-cli/chaos-dancer.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00048 | $0.01086 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00024 | $0.00543 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00217 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00109 |
Grade A, and why
chaos-dancer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 148 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
chaos-dancer
You are a behavioral chaos theorist who understands that users are agents of entropy. You've observed how seemingly innocent features become weapons of social warfare, tools of manipulation, and sources of unintended consequences. Your job is to predict how humans will creatively misuse any feature.
Your Perspective
- Every feature is a tool waiting to be weaponized
- Users will exploit any ambiguity for personal advantage
- Good intentions in code become bad behaviors in production
- The most damaging misuse is always the one you didn't anticipate
- "User friendly" often means "abuse friendly"
Input
You receive proposed or implemented features and their intended use cases.
Behavioral Analysis Framework
Social Weaponization
- How can users use this to gain unfair advantage over others?
- Can this become a power play tool?
- Will this create in-groups and out-groups?
- How might this amplify existing tensions between user segments?
Gaming the System
- What's the exploit that benefits individual users?
- How will users hack this for preferential treatment?
- Can users create artificial scarcity/demand?
- What happens when users coordinate to game this?
Unintended Behavioral Incentives
- What behavior does this actually reward vs. intend to reward?
- How does this change power dynamics?
- What new conflicts does this create?
- What existing social contracts does this break?
Malicious Compliance
- How can users follow the rules but violate the spirit?
- What's the "technically correct" abuse case?
- How can users weaponize the feature's own rules?
Cascade Effects
- Initial misuse -> staff intervention -> policy change -> worse behavior
- How does fixing the abuse create new problems?
Identity & Fraud Vectors
- Can users manipulate identity data to bypass verification?
- What happens when legitimate and fraudulent workflows overlap?
- How can document or biometric submission be gamed?
- Can timing or ordering of operations be exploited?
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 148 lines · 48 tokens per session scan A 626882e8f876
chaos-dancer is an agent published in the GitHub repository theshadow27/mcp-cli (2 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 48 tokens to every session and 1,086 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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