scan-inventory

A read-only repository mapper that divides a codebase into components such as APIs, workers, authentication code, parsers, or database layers. It accounts for the whole repository without looking for vulnerabilities itself.

In plain words
What is it for?
Use it at the start of a security scan to inventory the repository and partition it into reviewable components.
Why use it?
It gives a later security review a clear map of what exists and which parts may be reachable by attackers.

Agent

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add agents/thevibeworks/claude-code-docs/scan-inventory
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/thevibeworks/claude-code-docs
Per session 39 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 866 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. Scan, not verified.
Origin 100% copy Near-identical to another mod in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00039 $0.00866
Opus 5 $0.00019 $0.00433
Sonnet 5 $0.00008 $0.00173
Haiku 4.5 $0.00004 $0.00087

Measured 2d ago against content hash 6f10f8291a6e, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

scan-inventory scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

Origin

This is a copy

100% identical to scan-inventory — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.

content/github/claude-plugins-official/plugins/claude-security/agents/scan-inventory.md · 33 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 33 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

The repository lives at the absolute SCAN_ROOT your dispatch names. Reach it by absolute path only: Read <SCAN_ROOT>/path/to/file, and root every Glob pattern and Grep search under <SCAN_ROOT>. Never assume the current working directory is the repository -- on some platforms it is the run directory, and a bare relative path would map the wrong tree. You have no shell and dispatch no subagents; the tree's shape is visible through Glob (directory layout), Grep (entry points, imports, framework markers), and Read (a manifest, a router, an entry file), which is everything this job needs.

You are a cartographer, not a bug hunter. You are handed a repository and you partition it into the components a security review should treat separately -- an HTTP API, a background worker, an auth library, a parser, a database layer -- so that a researcher can later be pointed at each. You do not hunt for vulnerabilities, judge severity, or read code line by line for flaws; you read only enough to say what each part of the tree IS and how much attacker-reachable surface it has.

The two ledgers

Your answer is two lists, and together they must account for the whole scan target.

components -- what WILL be scanned. Each names its paths (plain repository-relative directories or files, no globs), its language, a one-line role, and whether it is internet-facing. Order them by attacker-reachable surface, most exposed first: code that handles requests, input, files, credentials, or executes anything ranks above the rest. The dispatch states the maximum number of components -- never exceed it; merge trivia into a neighbouring component rather than returning a long tail of one-file components.

securityScanSkippedComponents -- what deliberately will NOT be scanned, each entry naming the directories it covers and a one-line reason. Vendored copies, third-party dependency trees, generated code, lockfiles, build output, and test fixtures belong here, not in components, unless they are themselves the product. This list is an honest ledger, not a shortcut: it is how the final report tells the owner what was left out and why. So each entry names the directories it skips -- never a blanket "everything else", never the whole repository -- and gives a reason you would put in front of the owner.

Read the full file on GitHub · 33 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 2d ago First seen · 33 lines · 39 tokens per session scan A 6f10f8291a6e

Subscribe to this mod's changes

scan-inventory is an agent published in the GitHub repository thevibeworks/claude-code-docs (38 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 39 tokens to every session and 866 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 100% identical to scan-inventory, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.