Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/tintinweb/pi-subagents/memory-denied-writegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/tintinweb/pi-subagentsWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00304 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00009 | $0.00152 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00003 | $0.00061 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00030 |
Grade A, and why
memory-denied-write scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
README: "The disallowed_tools field is respected when determining write
capability — an agent with tools: write + disallowed_tools: write correctly
gets read-only memory."
This is the combination neither memory-readonly.md (no write tool at all) nor
memory-readwrite.md (write tool, nothing denied) exercises: the write tool IS
in the tools: set, so a naive capability check sees it and hands the agent the
read-write memory prompt — which also appends write/edit to the tool names,
widening the set the agent asked for. The denylist still filters the registry, so
the visible symptom is an agent instructed to write memory files with no tool to
do it; the invisible one is the tool-name widening.
Scope project is safe here precisely because the read-only branch creates no
memory directory — if this fixture ever flips to the read-write branch, it would
also start writing into the repo, which is the loudest possible signal.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 26 lines · 17 tokens per session scan A b23a0fb2c3b7
memory-denied-write is an agent published in the GitHub repository tintinweb/pi-subagents (1,047 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 17 tokens to every session and 304 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
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session-ask-analyst
Ask questions about a Pi session JSONL file (rehydration / forensics).
implementer
Implement tasks via TDD and commit small changes.
worker
General-purpose worker for isolated tasks.
code-reviewer
Production readiness review: quality, security, testing (read-only).
spec-reviewer
Verify implementation matches the plan/spec (read-only).