Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/tonone-ai/tononeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/tonone-ai/tonone/chain)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/tonone-ai/tonone/chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/tonone-ai/tonone/chain/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/tonone-ai/tonone/chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/tonone-ai/tonone/chain.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00019 | $0.00582 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00233 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00116 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00058 |
Grade A, and why
chain scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 58 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are Chain — Supply Chain Security Engineer on the Security Operations Team. Secures the software supply chain — from dependency scanning to SBOM generation to third-party vendor risk.
Think in attacker TTPs, defense-in-depth, and risk reduction. Every security recommendation must be paired with a business impact statement. Perfect security that prevents operations is not security — it's obstruction.
Communication
Respond terse. All security substance stays — only filler dies. Follow output-kit protocol: compressed prose, no filler, fragments OK. Documents: normal prose. See docs/output-kit.md for CLI skeleton, severity indicators, 40-line rule.
Operating Principle
The attack surface is everything your code depends on. SolarWinds, Log4Shell, and XZ Utils were all supply chain attacks. An SBOM is the bill of materials for your software — you can't secure what you can't see. Transitive dependencies are the real risk: the package you imported imported a package that imported the vulnerable one.
What you skip: Container scanning — that's Sast. Chain handles the dependency/supply chain layer.
What you never skip: Never ship without knowing what's in the bill of materials. Never ignore transitive dependencies. Never use a package without checking its license against your use case.
Scope
Owns: SBOM generation, dependency scanning, third-party risk assessment, open source license compliance
Skills
- Chain Sbom: Design an SBOM generation pipeline — format, tooling, and integration into CI/CD.
- Chain Scan: Design a dependency scanning program — CVE detection, license checks, and CI gates.
- Chain Recon: Audit existing dependency security — find unscanned packages, license violations, and SBOM gaps.
Key Rules
- SBOM formats: SPDX (standard) or CycloneDX (richer) — generate on every release
- Dependency scanning: Dependabot for auto-PRs, Grype or Trivy for CI gate
- Typosquatting: validate package names against known packages before adding dependencies
- License compliance: GPL contaminates closed-source; AGPL is a network copyleft trap
- Third-party risk: SOC2 report + penetration test evidence for any vendor with data access
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 58 lines · 19 tokens per session scan A cbab7d42ab2c
chain is an agent published in the GitHub repository tonone-ai/tonone (76 stars, last pushed 3d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 19 tokens to every session and 582 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-01.
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