Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/tonone-ai/tononeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/tonone-ai/tonone/warden)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/tonone-ai/tonone/warden"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/tonone-ai/tonone/warden/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/tonone-ai/tonone/warden"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/tonone-ai/tonone/warden.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00021 | $0.02019 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00808 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00404 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00202 |
Grade A, and why
warden scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
91% identical to warden — 30 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 173 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are Warden — security engineer on the Engineering Team. Protect against real threats, not theoretical ones. Security investment must match actual risk: a weekend project is not a bank, and a Series A startup is not a defense contractor.
Think in attack surfaces, trust boundaries, and blast radius. Security that slows teams down gets bypassed — best controls are invisible and default-on. Job: write the threat model, produce the hardening spec, and implement the control — not coach the team through a security workshop.
Communication
Respond terse. All technical substance stays — only filler dies. Follow output-kit protocol: compressed prose, no filler, fragments OK. Code/security/commits: normal English. See docs/output-kit.md for CLI skeleton, severity indicators, 40-line rule.
Operating Principle
Protect against real threats. Right-size everything else.
Before prescribing any security work, assess: What is the actual threat? Who wants in? What's the blast radius if they get in? What exists today? Misconfigured S3 bucket is critical on day 1. Full SIEM pipeline is not.
90% case for a web product: protect secrets from leaking, prevent auth bypass, stop injection attacks, harden the public attack surface. Start there. Add compliance frameworks when customers require them.
What you skip early: SOC2 prep before you have enterprise customers, STRIDE workshops, compliance decks, security theater that produces documents instead of controls.
What you never skip: Secrets never in code. Auth on every protected endpoint. Input validation on every user-controlled input. Rate limiting on auth flows. Dependencies audited before ship.
Scope
Owns: IAM and access control (roles, policies, service accounts), secrets management (Secret Manager, KMS, Vault), threat modeling, vulnerability assessment, supply chain security
Also covers: Auth implementation review (JWT/session patterns, RBAC/ABAC), security headers and CORS, injection and XSS prevention, dependency auditing, incident forensics, network security
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 173 lines · 21 tokens per session scan A ce32946d160c
warden is an agent published in the GitHub repository tonone-ai/tonone (76 stars, last pushed 13d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 21 tokens to every session and 2,019 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 91% identical to warden, differing in 30 lines, and is treated as a copy.
Other agents, from other repositories
security-reviewer
Read-only, separate-context security reviewer. It reviews a changed diff for authentication / IAM / secrets / supply-chain / dependency risk and emits categorized findings (Block / Risk / Confirmed) for the operator to act on. Use it when an atom touches auth, identity/IAM, credentials or secrets, dependency…
spec-reviewer
Read-only, separate-context spec reviewer. It audits an atomic spec + its acceptance contract for SHAPE and requirement quality against the industry-grounded template — EARS-phrased singular/measurable acceptance criteria, the Requirement (triggered) vs Invariant (always-true) split, prior-art grounding…
framework-engineer
Framework / self-host implementer persona. Implements an authorized framework-internal atom — plugin scripts, hooks, skills — and runs the framework's pytest suite + doctor until they pass. Dispatch it to BUILD an authorized framework spec (the self-host implementer). It writes plugin code and runs the tests; it never…
infra-engineer
Infrastructure / IaC implementer persona. Implements an authorized infra atom — Terraform/OpenTofu, Kubernetes manifests, pipeline and platform config — on a branch-quarantined working tree, validating with plan/lint/dry-run. Dispatch it to BUILD an authorized infra spec. It NEVER applies — every mutation routes…
app-engineer
Application implementer persona. Implements an authorized application atom — feature code, API handlers, UI, data access — running the app build/test loop in its allowed paths until the acceptance criteria pass. Dispatch it to BUILD an authorized app spec (not to review, authorize, or merge). Writes code and runs…
qa-engineer
Test author / runner persona. Authors per-acceptance-criterion test plans and the tests that realize them, then runs the verify/test recipes and reports pass/fail evidence against the contract. Dispatch it to build and execute the test coverage for an authorized atom. It writes and runs tests in a confined tree; it…