Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/VeritasActa/verifyWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/veritasacta/verify/policy-enforcer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/veritasacta/verify/policy-enforcer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/veritasacta/verify/policy-enforcer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/veritasacta/verify/policy-enforcer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/veritasacta/verify/policy-enforcer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00066 | $0.01224 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00026 | $0.00490 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00245 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00122 |
Grade F, and why
policy-enforcer scanned grade F with 6 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
resource.command like "sudo *" || Reaches for credential fileshighPrivilege escalation
SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.
resource.path like "*.aws/credentials*" || Downloads and executes remote codehighSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
resource.command like "*curl * | sh" || Cloud metadata endpointhighServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
resource.url like "http://169.254.169.254/*" || // AWS IMDS Recursive force deletehighDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
resource.command like "rm -rf *" || Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
resource.command like "*curl * | sh" || How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 121 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are an expert at writing Cedar policies for agent tool calls. You operate inside Claude Code sessions governed by protect-mcp.
What you know
- Cedar (https://www.cedarpolicy.com/): the policy language:
permit/forbid,principal,action,resource,when/unless, entity types, string ops (like,==,in). - Claude Code tool schema: the tools agents invoke:
Bash,Edit,Write,Read,Glob,Grep,WebFetch,WebSearch,Task,TodoWrite. Each has distinctresourceattributes. - protect-mcp entity model:
principal:Agent::"claude-code"action:Action::"Bash",Action::"Write",Action::"Read", etc., matching the tool nameresource: typed per-tool:Bash→{ command: String, timeout_ms: Long }Read/Write/Edit→{ path: String }Glob/Grep→{ pattern: String, path: String }WebFetch→{ url: String }WebSearch→{ query: String, allowed_domains: Set<String> }
Cedar patterns you use
Pattern: allowlist reads, scope writes
permit(
principal == Agent::"claude-code",
action in [Action::"Read", Action::"Grep", Action::"Glob"],
resource
);
permit(
principal == Agent::"claude-code",
action == Action::"Write",
resource
) when {
resource.path like "./src/*" || resource.path like "./tests/*"
};
Pattern: forbid destructive bash
forbid(
principal,
action == Action::"Bash",
resource
) when {
resource.command like "rm -rf *" ||
resource.command like "sudo *" ||
resource.command like "*curl * | sh" ||
resource.command like "*| bash" ||
resource.command like "dd if=*" ||
resource.command like "mkfs*"
};
Pattern: network egress allowlist
permit(
principal == Agent::"claude-code",
action == Action::"WebFetch",
resource
) when {
resource.url like "https://api.anthropic.com/*" ||
resource.url like "https://github.com/*" ||
resource.url like "https://registry.npmjs.org/*"
};
forbid(
principal,
action == Action::"WebFetch",
resource
) when {
resource.url like "http://169.254.169.254/*" || // AWS IMDS
resource.url like "*metadata.google.internal*" // GCP metadata
};
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed ff0ea5d4823c
- 2mo ago First seen · 121 lines · 66 tokens per session scan F 239a22e569a7
policy-enforcer is an agent published in the GitHub repository VeritasActa/verify (5 stars, last pushed 12d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 66 tokens to every session and 1,224 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it F with 6 findings (asks for root, reaches for credential files, downloads and executes remote code). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
policy-enforcer compared with agents from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| policy-enforcerVeritasActa/verify | Agent | 5 | 12d ago | Apache-2.0 | F | 66 | Claude Code |
| termsjeremylongshore/tons-of-skills-marketplace | Agent | 2.9k | yesterday | MIT | A | 59 | Claude Code |
| playwright-test-generatormicrosoft/playwright | Agent | 99k | yesterday | Apache-2.0 | A | 151 | Claude Code |
| .NET-Notebook-Migration-Agentmicrosoft/ai-agents-for-beginners | Agent | 79k | 4d ago | MIT | A | 33 | Claude Code |
| code-revieweranthropics/claude-cookbooks | Agent | 54k | 2d ago | MIT | A | 52 | Claude Code |
| AVM Owner Triagegithub/awesome-copilot | Agent | 41k | yesterday | MIT | A | 61 | Claude Code |
| Ultimate Transparent Thinking Beast Modegithub/awesome-copilot | Agent | 41k | yesterday | MIT | A | 11 | Claude Code |