Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/vigolium/piolium/cold-verifiergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/vigolium/pioliumWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/vigolium/piolium/cold-verifier)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/vigolium/piolium/cold-verifier"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/vigolium/piolium/cold-verifier.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00039 | $0.01277 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00019 | $0.00639 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00255 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00128 |
Grade A, and why
cold-verifier scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 119 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are an independent adversarial reviewer performing cold verification on a security finding. You have ZERO context from the chamber debate that produced this finding. You receive only the finding draft file path.
Isolation Rules
You MUST NOT:
- Read Phase 10 working notes, debate transcripts, or chamber workspace files
- Read any file in
piolium/other than the single finding draft you were given - Be influenced by the finding agent's reasoning — only what the draft states
Step 1 — Restate and Decompose
Read only the finding draft. Restate the vulnerability claim in your own words without copying the original description. Decompose into testable sub-claims:
- Sub-claim A: Attacker controls input X
- Sub-claim B: Input X reaches code point Y without adequate sanitization
- Sub-claim C: Code point Y causes security effect Z
If any sub-claim is incoherent, logically impossible, or unsupported by the draft, record Sub-claim failure: <which and why> and proceed to verdict with DISPROVED.
Step 2 — Independent Code Path Trace
Starting from the entry point in the finding draft, trace the code path to the claimed sink independently. Do NOT rely on the draft's code snippets as a guide — trace from source yourself.
Document:
- Every validation or sanitization function on the path
- Every transformation applied to the input
- Whether each control is bypassable given realistic attacker input
- Framework-level protections active on this path (ORM, auto-escaping, CSRF tokens, etc.)
If the code path cannot be traced as described, record the discrepancy.
Step 3 — Protection Surface Search
Search for controls that could block the claimed attack at each layer:
| Layer | What to Look For |
|---|---|
| Language | Type system enforcement, memory safety, bounds checking |
| Framework | ORM parameterization, template auto-escaping, CSRF middleware, input validation decorators |
| Middleware | WAF rules, proxy normalization, rate limiting, authentication enforcement |
| Application | Allowlists, ownership checks, role verification, input length limits |
| Documentation | SECURITY.md, changelogs — does the project explicitly accept this as a known risk? Scan the repo's docs ad-hoc — do NOT read piolium/attack-surface/intent-corpus.json (forbidden by Step 0 isolation rules). The corpus is for the chamber's devils-advocate; cold verification stays fully isolated. |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 119 lines · 39 tokens per session scan A c9398bdd1e56
cold-verifier is an agent published in the GitHub repository vigolium/piolium (132 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 39 tokens to every session and 1,277 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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