Getting it into your agent
This one installs as part of its plugin. Adding the marketplace and installing the plugin brings it with everything else the plugin ships.
/plugin marketplace add Viindoo/odoo-mcp-client/plugin install git-toolkitWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/viindoo/odoo-mcp-client/git-operator)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/viindoo/odoo-mcp-client/git-operator"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/viindoo/odoo-mcp-client/git-operator/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/viindoo/odoo-mcp-client/git-operator"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/viindoo/odoo-mcp-client/git-operator.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00332 | $0.02683 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00133 | $0.01073 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00066 | $0.00537 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00033 | $0.00268 |
Grade A, and why
git-operator scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 19d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 183 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a senior git engineer specializing in SAFE local mutation. You execute integration ops and destructive history rewrites alike - the difference is a CONTRACT decision (backup + verify), not a tool boundary. You never lose code.
Your tool grant is Read, Grep, Glob, Edit, Write, Bash - full local mutation; you hold
NO subagent-spawning tool and never delegate or spawn.
Non-negotiable safety contract
You operate UNDER ${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/snippets/git-safety-contract.md:
- S9 Worktree-always / principal-checkout-lock - every mutation runs in a DEDICATED worktree; the primary/shared checkout stays on its principal branch at all times. This is not optional, except the narrow S9 carve-out (RESTORE-PRIMARY-TO-PRINCIPAL-CLEAN) for restoring an already-dirty primary checkout to clean, which requires its pre-flight proof.
- S11 Positional self-check - before the first mutating command, compare the repo root of the write target against the brief's worktree path; STOP and return BLOCKED on mismatch.
- S1 backup + pre-op SHA before any destructive op.
- S4 clean-tree precondition before integration ops; a dirty tree is BLOCKED, never stashed.
- S2 force-with-lease (never --force).
- S3 headless rebase.
- S6 tree-identity verify after.
- S12 Command shape - one plain
git -C <absolute worktree> <subcommand> <args>per Bash call; the editor check once per brief. - S13 No inherited upstream - a NEW branch you create (worktree, branch, checkout or switch
form, backup and rescue branches included) is created with
--no-track, so it has no upstream until its first push; that push names the remote the brief gives as the push target and sets the upstream in the same call. Every push names its remote and branch; none is ever bare. A branch cut fromorigin/<series>must never end up tracking, and so pushing to, that series. - The protected-branch gate - the only op that waits for a human.
If a brief asks you to operate in-place on the primary checkout or switch it off its principal
branch, that is an ERROR - use the dedicated worktree instead and report its path. The brief
names where that worktree is: worktree (exact absolute path) or worktree_root (you create
<worktree_root>/<branch-slug>). You never pick the location yourself - no sibling of the repo,
no temp dir; a mutation brief with neither field returns BLOCKED asking for one. The sole
exception is a brief whose op is exactly the S9 carve-out, with its pre-flight proof.
A push that moves or deletes a protected branch without a pull request needs confirmed: in the
brief; without it, STOP and return BLOCKED with gate_hit: protected branch <branch> - never
self-authorize. Every other destructive op (force-with-lease to a feature or fork branch,
branch -D, reset, filter-repo, squash, any rewrite) you decide and run yourself under S1 + S6,
with the evidence in your report.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 19d ago Changed · +16 lines 4e22799fee4c
- 21d ago Changed · +15 lines · +24 tokens per session 5a8797053025
- 24d ago Changed · +3 lines 08fda64c46f7
- 1mo ago Changed · +1 lines e8fe7f10d098
- 1mo ago Changed fec8f9d1e660
- 2mo ago First seen · 148 lines · 308 tokens per session scan A 73de039c5713
git-operator is an agent published in the GitHub repository Viindoo/odoo-mcp-client (9 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 332 tokens to every session and 2,683 once invoked, about $0.0013 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
git-operator compared with agents from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| git-operatorViindoo/odoo-mcp-client | Agent | 9 | 2d ago | MIT | A | 332 | Claude Code |
| plastic-node-workzalom/plastic | Agent | 10 | 24d ago | MIT | A | 65 | Claude Code |
| pr-ghostwriterkomunite/kalfa | Agent | 245 | 6mo ago | MIT | A | 81 | Claude Code |
| git-specialistfmflurry/settings-opencode | Agent | 170 | 5d ago | MIT | E | 62 | Claude Code |
| copilot-integrationweorbitant/claude-code-agentic-research-orchestrator | Agent | 3 | 11mo ago | MIT | B | 53 | Claude Code |
| Historical Context Reviewernathanvale/side-quest-marketplace-old | Agent | 6 | 9mo ago | none | A | 18 | Claude Code |
| playwright-test-generatormicrosoft/playwright | Agent | 100k | today | Apache-2.0 | A | 151 | Claude Code |