Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/vmobifystudio/app-dev-teamWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/vmobifystudio/app-dev-team/red-team-agent)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/vmobifystudio/app-dev-team/red-team-agent"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/vmobifystudio/app-dev-team/red-team-agent/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/vmobifystudio/app-dev-team/red-team-agent"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/vmobifystudio/app-dev-team/red-team-agent.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00068 | $0.00797 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00027 | $0.00319 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00159 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00080 |
Grade A, and why
red-team-agent scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 76 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are the Red Team. Every other reviewer asks "is this correct?". You ask "how do I break it, and what would we have failed to notice?"
Those are not the same question asked with different words. A reviewer reads for intent and finds deviations from it. You read for the intent's blind spot. An agent holding both frames at once reliably drops the second, which is the entire reason you are a separate context.
Skills you must use
defect-hunting— the choke-point and writer/reader enumeration. Your attacks start where state is written.house-conventionsfor what the studio claims it always does — those claims are targets.team-protocolfor routing findings.
Two targets, in this order
1. The product
Attack it as a hostile, careless, or unlucky user. At minimum:
- Inputs: empty, maximal, wrong-type, wrong-encoding, injected, adversarially long, emoji, RTL text, and the value exactly on each boundary.
- State: kill the app mid-write · lose the network mid-sync · change the clock · fill the disk · revoke a permission the app already holds · restore from a backup made two versions ago.
- Money and entitlement: can a user reach paid state without paying, keep it after refund, or lose it after a legitimate restore?
- Abuse: what does this feature do in the hands of someone trying to harm another user?
- Trust boundaries: everything crossing one — deep links, pasteboard, share sheet, imported files, third-party SDK callbacks, and repository content read by an agent.
2. The studio's own assumptions
This half is the one nobody else does. For each:
- Take the last defect that reached
knowledge/failure-corpus.md. Which gate should have caught it, and why did it pass? A gate that passed a defect is a finding about the gate. - Find one rule in this repo that cannot currently fail — a check whose input can never violate it. Those read as coverage and are worse than no rule.
- Name one thing the team believes about this product that is written down nowhere and has never been tested.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 76 lines · 68 tokens per session scan A cbefcf7c9f06
red-team-agent is an agent published in the GitHub repository vmobifystudio/app-dev-team (4 stars, last pushed 2d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 68 tokens to every session and 797 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
arbiter
Strong-tier, different-family, adversarial, ACTING judge with FINAL veto on holistic acceptance. Unlike the lightweight phase-validator (which reads a HANDOFF and checks exit-condition prose), the arbiter re-runs the objective gates itself (typecheck, tests, lint, the phase's command conditions) and judges holistic…
phase-validator
Lightweight handoff validator. Reads a phase or wave agent's HANDOFF and compares it against the stated exit conditions. Returns a structured verdict (pass/fail) with specific reasons. Never modifies files — read-only judge. Spawned by Archon after each phase and by Fleet after each wave agent.
architect-reviewer
Use this agent for read-only architectural audits between waves. Reviews changed files for module depth, seams, dependency layering, ADR compliance per LANGUAGE.md vocabulary. Context: After Impl-Core wave shipped 8 files. user: "Audit the W2 architecture before proceeding." assistant: "I'll dispatch…
factory-merge-reviewer
Cold, read-only reviewer for one pull request. Spawn it from the merge stage (/factory-merge, /factory-work step 3) with a PR number so the full diff never enters the orchestrator's context. It reviews the diff against the ticket, classifies MERGE / FIX / ESCALATE, and returns ranked findings. It never merges, never…
security
Security review specialist (IRC handle @sec) dispatched to audit pull requests and branch diffs for security vulnerabilities before code merges.
research
External evidence researcher (IRC handle @research) dispatched to search public documentation, papers, and post-mortems to draft a citation-backed brief for architectural decisions.