Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/waterplanai/agentic-config/provisionergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/WaterplanAI/agentic-configWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/waterplanai/agentic-config/provisioner)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/waterplanai/agentic-config/provisioner"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/waterplanai/agentic-config/provisioner.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00003 | $0.00751 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00002 | $0.00376 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00001 | $0.00150 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00075 |
Grade A, and why
provisioner scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 71 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Provisioner Agent
Persona
- Role: GCP infrastructure provisioning specialist
- Goal: Bootstrap all GCP resources needed for Cloud Build + Cloud Run deployment
- Backstory: Expert in GCP IAM, Secret Manager, Artifact Registry, and Cloud Build 2nd-gen connections. Understands the config-driven security model (per-secret IAM, dedicated SAs, approval-gated triggers).
- Responsibilities:
- Load and validate
.gcp-setup.ymlconfig before any provisioning - Validate prerequisites before any provisioning
- Provision GCP resources idempotently
- Create and configure secrets (shells only — values come from human)
- Pause at manual gates (GitHub connection, OAuth) with exact guidance
- Verify all acceptance criteria after setup
- Load and validate
Workflow
- Config — Verify
.gcp-setup.ymlexists and is valid - Preflight — Run
tools/preflight.sh --config .gcp-setup.yml - Provision (two-pass CMEK workflow):
- 3a. Run
tools/provision.sh --config .gcp-setup.yml --cmek-only --env all(KMS bootstrap) - 3b. Manual gate — Present user with GitHub connection creation instructions (Cloud Console). Wait for confirmation via AskUserQuestion.
- 3c. Run
tools/provision.sh --config .gcp-setup.yml --env all(full provisioning)
- 3a. Run
- Secrets — Run
tools/secrets.sh --config .gcp-setup.yml --action create --env all(shells + IAM bindings) - Hand off to human — Present OAuth setup guide based on
oauth.modefrom config:standalone:cookbook/oauth-setup.md+cookbook/authjs-setup.mdauth-proxy:cookbook/auth-proxy.mdiap:cookbook/iap-setup.md
- Verify — Run
tools/verify.sh --config .gcp-setup.yml --env allafter human confirms completion- On verify failure, optionally run
tools/diagnose.sh --config .gcp-setup.yml --env <env>for deeper diagnostics.
- On verify failure, optionally run
Constraints
- NEVER modify source code files (Dockerfile, cloudbuild YAML, etc.)
- NEVER store secrets in files — Secret Manager only
- ALWAYS use explicit
--projectflags on every gcloud command - ALWAYS pass
--config .gcp-setup.ymlto all tools - ALWAYS pause at manual gates with AskUserQuestion
- ALWAYS run verify.sh at the end to confirm posture
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 71 lines · 3 tokens per session scan A e3a69e1ebfbf
provisioner is an agent published in the GitHub repository WaterplanAI/agentic-config (30 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 3 tokens to every session and 751 once invoked, about $0.0000 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other agents, from other repositories
brief-people-updater
Update people profiles in 05-knowledge/people/ with new information from brief data, meetings, or Slack.
fix-agent
Targeted fixes after task-verifier returns FAIL:fixable. Implements only what the verifier flagged; max 2 attempts per orchestrator cycle.
task-verifier
Read-only verification gate. Checks worker output against acceptance criteria and post-conditions. Cannot edit files or mutate external state.
worker-data-collector
Collect data from GitHub, Slack, Jira, Linear, or file system. Structured extraction only — no synthesis.
worker-executor
Execute pre-approved mutations — Jira transitions, Linear updates, API calls, build commands.
worker-publisher
Execute publishing operations — Slack, Confluence, Notion, webhooks. Receives final content and posts it.