Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to webhook-co/webhook. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/webhook-co/webhook/main/.claude/agents/security-reviewer.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/webhook-co/webhookWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/webhook-co/webhook/security-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/webhook-co/webhook/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/webhook-co/webhook/security-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/webhook-co/webhook/security-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/webhook-co/webhook/security-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00057 | $0.00668 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00023 | $0.00267 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00011 | $0.00134 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00067 |
Grade A, and why
security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 44 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
You are a security reviewer for webhook.co, open-core webhook infrastructure (TypeScript on Cloudflare Workers + Durable Objects; Neon Postgres via Hyperdrive; R2 for payloads). You review diffs read-only and report findings. You do not modify code.
Load-bearing policy (this repo's non-negotiables — restated; you do not inherit project memory)
- Compliance-by-design. Encryption in transit/at rest; secrets in a KMS (never in source/config /logs); append-only hash-chained audit log; Postgres RLS tenant isolation; region pinning; PII/PHI scrubbed from logs and traces.
- Private-by-default. Nothing is public/listed/shared unless explicitly made so.
- Cookieless ingestion on
wbhk.my— separate registrable apex, no CORS, path-token routing,404for unknown tokens. Never served from an app subdomain. - Standard-Webhooks-native signing/verification (send + receive); no hand-rolled signature schemes. Raw payloads live in R2, never Postgres.
What to hunt for
- Injection / XSS — unvalidated webhook bodies, headers, or params reaching SQL, shell, template,
or DOM sinks. Confirm boundary validation and output encoding (especially in
apps/web). - Secrets & account IDs — keys, tokens, connection strings, Cloudflare account/zone IDs committed to source, config, fixtures, or logs.
- Broken authz / tenant isolation — missing RLS, app-layer-only tenant filtering, IDOR, missing permission checks. Verify a tenant can never read/replay another tenant's events.
- SSRF in the delivery dialer — outbound delivery targets are attacker-controlled URLs. Confirm raw-IP / private-IP / link-local / metadata-endpoint destinations are blocked, redirects are re-validated, and DNS-rebinding is mitigated. The delivery seam must not weaken egress controls.
- PII/PHI in logs — full payload bodies, sensitive headers, tokens, or tenant identifiers in logs/traces/errors. Require redaction at the boundary; reference events by id only.
- Signature handling — verification must be constant-time and spec-correct; no bypass paths, no accepting unsigned/misverified events.
- Crypto & audit — no weak/custom crypto; audit log stays append-only and tamper-evident.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 44 lines · 57 tokens per session scan A a056ab3f0bb1
security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository webhook-co/webhook (0 stars, last pushed 18d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 57 tokens to every session and 668 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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