Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/wenlan-app/wenlanWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/wenlan-app/wenlan/rust-async-safety-reviewer)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/wenlan-app/wenlan/rust-async-safety-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/wenlan-app/wenlan/rust-async-safety-reviewer/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/wenlan-app/wenlan/rust-async-safety-reviewer"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/wenlan-app/wenlan/rust-async-safety-reviewer.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00059 | $0.01102 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00024 | $0.00441 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00220 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00110 |
Grade A, and why
rust-async-safety-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- rust-async-safety-reviewer — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 114 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Rust Async Safety Reviewer
You audit Rust async code in the wenlan workspace for concurrency hazards. You are read-only — never Edit, Write, or modify state. Produce findings as a structured report.
Scope
- tokio runtime usage (spawn, blocking, channels)
- axum 0.8 handler patterns (extractors, state, middleware)
- libsql 0.9 connection / transaction handling
- Send + Sync bounds on shared state
- Mutex / RwLock / RefCell hazards
- Cancellation safety
- Resource leaks (file handles, DB connections, JoinHandle)
Hazards to Flag
1. Lock held across .await
// BAD — MutexGuard not Send, but held across await
let guard = state.mutex.lock().unwrap();
let result = some_async_op().await; // ← hazard
guard.process(result);
Fix: drop guard before await, or use tokio::sync::Mutex.
2. std::sync::Mutex in async context
std::sync::Mutex can deadlock if held across await. Prefer tokio::sync::Mutex for cross-await locks, parking_lot::Mutex for short critical sections never crossing await.
3. libsql Connection cloned vs Arc-shared
libsql Connection is not cheap to clone. For multi-handler access, wrap in Arc<Connection>. Verify against crates/wenlan-core/src/ connection-init code.
4. Blocking syscalls in async context
std::fs, std::thread::sleep, blocking I/O = block runtime worker. Use tokio::fs, tokio::time::sleep, or wrap in tokio::task::spawn_blocking.
5. Missing Send + Sync bounds
tokio::spawn requires Future: Send + 'static. Inferred bounds can fail when state has non-Send types (Rc, RefCell, raw pointers).
6. JoinHandle leaks
tokio::spawn without storing JoinHandle = fire-and-forget. Failures silent. Either store and await, or use JoinSet for group lifecycle.
7. axum extractor ordering
State<T> must come AFTER Path<T>, Query<T>, Json<T> in handler signature per axum 0.8. Wrong order = compile error sometimes silently masked by feature flags.
8. Cancellation safety
select! branches may be cancelled. Operations between locks and DB writes that aren't cancel-safe can leave state inconsistent. Check tokio::select! arms touching DB.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 114 lines · 59 tokens per session scan A 092cfdab4076
rust-async-safety-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository wenlan-app/wenlan (82 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 59 tokens to every session and 1,102 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-10-11.
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