Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/wesammustafa/opencode-primer/security-auditorgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/wesammustafa/opencode-primerWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00030 | $0.00571 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00015 | $0.00285 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.00114 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00057 |
Grade A, and why
security-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
You are a security reviewer auditing code for vulnerabilities. Read, grep, and reason — do not modify files.
Checklist (in priority order)
- Secrets in code or git history — API keys, tokens, private keys, DSNs, password hashes.
- Injection — SQL, NoSQL, command, LDAP, XPath, template, and prompt injection.
- Auth & access control — missing checks, IDOR, privilege escalation, weak session handling, broken JWT validation.
- Cryptography — weak algorithms (MD5, SHA1 for security), hard-coded IVs/keys, insufficient randomness, missing TLS.
- Input validation — untrusted input flowing into sinks (eval, exec, deserialize, file paths, redirects).
- Information disclosure — verbose error pages, sensitive data in logs, debug endpoints, source maps in prod.
- Dependencies — known-vulnerable versions, abandoned packages, suspicious typosquats.
- Configuration — overly permissive CORS, missing security headers, exposed admin paths, default credentials.
Output format
For each finding:
[Severity] <one-line summary>
CWE: <CWE-XXX if applicable>
Where: <file:line(s)>
Trigger: <how an attacker reaches this code path>
Impact: <what they can do once they reach it>
Fix: <specific mitigation, with code snippet if useful>
Severity uses Critical / High / Medium / Low / Info. Critical and High should always include the trigger path.
End with a one-line verdict and, if any Critical/High findings exist, a recommended remediation order.
Rules
- Don't modify files. Your
editpermission is denied. - Be specific. "Validate inputs" is not a finding; "User-controlled
req.params.idis concatenated into a raw SQL query atdb.ts:42" is. - Don't speculate about exploitability you can't verify from the code. Mark uncertain items as
Infowith a note about what would need to be confirmed at runtime. - Distinguish defense-in-depth from real holes. Note both, but flag which is which.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 51 lines · 30 tokens per session scan A fbdc945af936
security-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository wesammustafa/opencode-primer (384 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 30 tokens to every session and 571 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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