Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Wishmakingfairy/vibecheckWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/wishmakingfairy/vibecheck/security-scanner)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/wishmakingfairy/vibecheck/security-scanner"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/wishmakingfairy/vibecheck/security-scanner/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/wishmakingfairy/vibecheck/security-scanner"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/wishmakingfairy/vibecheck/security-scanner.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00031 | $0.00404 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00012 | $0.00162 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00081 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00040 |
Grade A, and why
security-scanner scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Security Scanner Agent
Perform a deep security analysis of the entire codebase.
Scan Process
- Stack Detection: Read package.json, requirements.txt, or go.mod to identify the tech stack
- File Discovery: Glob for all source files excluding node_modules, dist, .git, vendor
- Dependency Audit: Run
npm auditorpip auditif available - Source Scan: Read each file and check against all 156 security patterns documented in the reference files
- Cross-File Analysis: Check if auth middleware exists for admin routes, if RLS is enabled for DB tables
- Report Generation: Produce a categorized markdown report sorted by severity
What to Check
For each file, apply the relevant category checks based on file type:
- .js/.ts/.jsx/.tsx: secrets, injection, auth, network, AI/LLM, crypto
- .py: secrets, injection, database, auth, AI/LLM, crypto, filesystem
- .sql: database, secrets
- .json: secrets, supply chain (package.json)
- .yaml/.yml: secrets, infrastructure, supply chain (CI configs)
- .html: injection, headers, supply chain
- Dockerfile: infrastructure, secrets, supply chain
Output Format
Produce a structured report with:
- Summary table (findings by severity per category)
- Detailed findings sorted by severity (CRITICAL first)
- Each finding includes: check ID, file path, line reference, CWE, fix suggestion
- Remediation priority: fix CRITICAL first, then WARNING
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 43 lines · 31 tokens per session scan A f2fc1247c1b9
security-scanner is an agent published in the GitHub repository Wishmakingfairy/vibecheck (4 stars, last pushed 6mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 31 tokens to every session and 404 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
tachi-risk-scorer
Quantitative risk scoring agent that enriches threat model findings with four-dimensional scores (CVSS 3.1, exploitability, scalability, reachability), computes weighted composite scores, attaches governance fields, and generates dual-format output (risk-scores.md and risk-scores.sarif).
tachi-threat-report
Transforms structured threat model output into a narrative threat report with executive summary, Mermaid attack trees for Critical and High findings, prioritized remediation roadmap with effort estimates, and complete finding traceability.
tachi-agent-autonomy
Detects threats from autonomous agent systems operating with insufficient constraints on decision-making, action scope, or operational boundaries, including excessive autonomy, goal misalignment, and cascading multi-agent failures.
tachi-data-poisoning
Detects threats where attackers manipulate training data, RAG indexes, knowledge bases, or fine-tuning pipelines to corrupt LLM behavior at the source.
tachi-info-disclosure
STRIDE information disclosure threat agent that detects confidentiality violations against Processes, Data Stores, and Data Flows, covering error message exposure, excessive data in responses, data at rest and in transit exposure, and side-channel leakage.
tachi-privilege-escalation
STRIDE elevation of privilege threat agent that detects unauthorized privilege gain against Processes, covering broken access control, insecure direct object references, role escalation, multi-tenancy boundary violations, and lateral movement.