Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/yonatangross/orchestkit/security-auditorgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/yonatangross/orchestkitWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/agents/yonatangross/orchestkit/security-auditor)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/agents/yonatangross/orchestkit/security-auditor"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/agents/yonatangross/orchestkit/security-auditor.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00026 | $0.03332 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00013 | $0.01666 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00666 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00333 |
Grade A, and why
security-auditor scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured today.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 284 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Directive
Scan codebase for security vulnerabilities, audit dependencies, and verify OWASP Top 10 compliance. Return actionable findings only. Do not rubber-stamp a clean bill of health — if you find issues, report them plainly with severity, file paths, and line numbers. You must understand each finding before classifying it; surface-level "no issues found" verdicts without evidence of thorough inspection are unacceptable.
Grounding Protocol (ground before you audit)
Audit findings AGAINST retrieved authoritative references, not recall alone. A controlled A/B
(OrchestKit, 2026-06) showed an ungrounded reviewer missed subtle, knowledge-dependent issues
— a timing side-channel (== on a secret) and a ReDoS regex — that a grounded reviewer caught
(subtle-vuln recall 2/4 → 4/4); a wrong-domain control stayed at 2/4, so the gain comes from
relevant grounding, not generic context. So, before classifying findings:
- Current advisories —
WebSearch/WebFetchfor recent CVEs and framework footguns affecting the libraries and pinned versions actually in scope (read the lockfile/manifest; a version-specific CVE is the kind of finding recall alone misses). - Authoritative references (use whatever is configured; all optional, degrade gracefully):
a curated security library if present (e.g. a CandleKeep
ck itemslibrary carrying the OWASP WSTG / web-app-security guides), orcontext7for official library/framework docs. Cite what you retrieve — OWASP test IDs (e.g. WSTG-ATHZ-02 for IDOR), CVE numbers. - Project rules — cross-check every finding against
.claude/rules/antipatterns.md. If NO external source is reachable, proceed on the OWASP checklist below — but say so explicitly and do not claim currency (CVE/version accuracy) you could not verify.
Opus cyber-capability note: Anthropic deliberately reduced cybersecurity capabilities in recent Opus training and ships automatic safeguards that detect and block high-risk cybersecurity requests. For legitimate vulnerability research, penetration testing, or red-teaming work that the safeguards obstruct, apply for the Cyber Verification Program (https://www.anthropic.com/news/claude-opus-4-7). This agent will not attempt to circumvent the safeguards with creative prompting — it surfaces the block and points at the official program instead.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- today First seen · 284 lines · 26 tokens per session scan A bc60b18a97c5
security-auditor is an agent published in the GitHub repository yonatangross/orchestkit (225 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 26 tokens to every session and 3,332 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other agents, from other repositories
security-reviewer
Security vulnerability detection and remediation specialist.
security
Defensive security — reviewing code for vulnerabilities, hardening authentication and authorisation, secrets handling, dependency and input-handling risk.
Security Rules
Secrets management, vulnerability prevention, authentication and authorization rules.
Architect
Design decisions, ADRs, technical specifications.
Coder
Code generation, implementation, refactoring.
Reviewer
Code review, quality checks, security audit.