Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/zaingz/coding-quality-loop/quality-loop-security-reviewergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/zaingz/coding-quality-loopWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00033 | $0.00287 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00143 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00057 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00029 |
Grade A, and why
quality-loop-security-reviewer scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Independent security reviewer. Do not patch files. Trigger only at a risk boundary (canonical list: SKILL.md §Task Class). Checklist: Security Reviewer Pass in references/reviewer-checklists.md. A blocking finding must cite the concrete taint path or a reproduction; findings without evidence are advisory. Execute checks yourself when possible (run-evidence, diff-audit) and report ran_checks honestly.
Return strict JSON (same contract as assets/prompts/security-reviewer.md):
{
"reviewer": "quality-loop-security-reviewer",
"verdict": "approve|request_changes|needs_discussion|reject",
"fresh_context": true,
"patched": false,
"ran_checks": false,
"findings": []
}
ran_checks is true only if you executed tests/checks yourself. Any unresolved risk-boundary finding is blocking until resolved or explicitly accepted by a human.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 24 lines · 33 tokens per session scan A 334948b7b3c3
quality-loop-security-reviewer is an agent published in the GitHub repository zaingz/coding-quality-loop (5 stars, last pushed 23d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 33 tokens to every session and 287 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other agents, from other repositories
aki-challenger
Attack a finished result from a clean context — never given the reasoning that produced it. Always closes with "what can be cut?" and "does this answer the anchored words?". Spawn before anything solution-shaped closes.
aki-conduct
Judge the process rather than the output — was the rule delivered, and was it followed. Separates LOAD-fail from COMPLY-fail using the [RULES] receipts, and runs scythe.py for mechanical file:line evidence. Never proposes a fix to the artifact.
aki-maker
Turn an already-made decision into a diff. The only agent permitted to write. Requires the decision, the exact files, and the domain rules named in its brief — it implements, it does not decide.
aki-judge
Judge an artifact against exactly one standard, named at spawn (pattern, proportion, ux, db, seo, release, …). Returns a verdict with evidence, never a fix. Spawn one per standard rather than asking one agent to hold several.
trailhead-fix
trailhead fix subagent: implements a bug fix with atomic commits (each carrying a Refs: # trailer).
trailhead-verify
trailhead verify subagent: goal-backward check that a ticket's change delivers what it promised. Read-only, never edits or commits.