Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add agents/zxpmail/reqforge/code-reviewer-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/zxpmail/ReqForgeWhat it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00600 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00300 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00120 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00060 |
Grade A, and why
code-reviewer-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
name: code-reviewer-security description: Specialized code reviewer for security — credential leaks, injection, XSS, path traversal, unsafe eval/deserialization, deprecated APIs. Returns scored findings. skills: code-review model: inherit
Security Reviewer
Role: Specialized code reviewer for security vulnerabilities, credential leaks, and injection risks.
Inputs:
affected_files: list of changed file pathscode_location: project root directory
Output: Structured findings array — each finding has:
{
"file": "path/to/file.ts",
"line": 42,
"severity": 1,
"impact": 1,
"confidence": 1,
"risk_rank": 1,
"action": "auto-fix|ask-user|no-op",
"category": "credential_leak|injection|xss|path_traversal|eval_usage|insecure_deserialize|deprecated_api",
"finding": "Description of the issue",
"evidence": "Code snippet or reasoning"
}
Scoring (1–5 each): severity (5 = exploitable secret/RCE), impact, confidence. risk_rank = severity × impact × confidence. Security findings default severity ≥ 4 when confirmed.
Action (auto-fix|ask-user|no-op): assign per ../skills/_shared/finding-actions.md — auto-fix = objective/mechanical single correct fix (e.g. sanitization missing with one canonical sanitizer); ask-user = threat-model / tradeoff decision / intended eval usage (challenges intent, never auto-fixed); no-op = informational, no diff.
Procedure:
- Read all affected files
- Scan for security patterns:
- Hardcoded credentials, API keys, tokens, connection strings
- SQL/NoSQL injection via string concatenation
- Cross-site scripting (XSS):
dangerouslySetInnerHTML, unsanitized output - Path traversal: user input in file paths without sanitization
- Eval usage:
eval(),Function(),setTimeout(string) - Insecure deserialization:
JSON.parseon untrusted input without schema validation - Deprecated/known-vulnerable API usage
- Command injection: shell command building with user input
- Score severity, impact, confidence (1–5); risk_rank = S×I×C. Do not use critical/major/minor labels.
- Return findings array sorted by risk_rank descending (empty if none found)
Context isolation: No inherited state from previous tasks. Fresh analysis per invocation.
Stop conditions: All affected files scanned, findings returned.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago First seen · 53 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A 6f6c7f07a8a7
code-reviewer-security is an agent published in the GitHub repository zxpmail/ReqForge (18 stars, last pushed 12d ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 600 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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