Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-aiWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/validate)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/validate"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/validate/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/validate"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai/validate.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.00987 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00395 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00197 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00099 |
Grade A, and why
validate scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
This is a copy
97% identical to validate — 1 line differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 134 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/validate
Run full validation on the current finding before writing a report.
What This Does
- Runs 7-Question Gate (one wrong answer = kill it)
- Checks against the always-rejected list
- Runs 4 pre-submission gates
- Outputs: PASS (write the report) or KILL (move on)
Usage
/validate
Describe the finding when prompted. Include:
- The endpoint
- The bug class
- What the PoC shows
- The target program
The 7-Question Gate
Answer each. ONE wrong answer = STOP.
Q1: Can I demonstrate this step-by-step RIGHT NOW?
Write this out:
1. Setup: I need [own account / another user's ID / no account]
2. Request: [exact HTTP method, URL, headers, body]
3. Result: Response shows [exact data / action completed]
4. Impact: Real consequence is [account takeover / PII exposed / money stolen]
5. Cost: Time: [X min], Capital: [$0 / $X]
If step 2 is "I need to look at the code more" → KILL IT.
Q2: Is the impact accepted by this program?
Check program scope page. Is your bug class listed? Is it excluded?
Q3: Is the vulnerable asset in scope?
Exact domain in scope? Not staging/dev? Not a third-party service?
Q4: Does it need admin or privileged access that an attacker can't get?
"Admin can do X" → KILL IT. "Regular user can do X that only admin should" → valid.
Q5: Is this known or documented behavior?
Search disclosed reports + changelog + API docs.
Q6: Can you prove impact beyond "technically possible"?
- XSS → actual cookie value in exfil request, not just alert()
- SSRF → response body from internal service, not just DNS callback
- IDOR → actual other-user's private data in response, not just 200 status
Q7: Is this on the never-submit list?
Missing headers, GraphQL introspection alone, clickjacking without PoC,
self-XSS, open redirect alone, SSRF DNS-only, logout CSRF, banner disclosure,
rate limit on non-critical forms, missing cookie flags alone...
If yes → KILL IT unless you have a chain.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 134 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A b4dd1a220925
validate is a command published in the GitHub repository adriannoes/awesome-agentic-ai (69 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed MIT. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 987 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. It is 97% identical to validate, differing in 1 line, and is treated as a copy.
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lint-check
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fix
A code-repair command that detects and fixes errors reported by language servers, linters, or type checkers. These tools find code problems such as invalid syntax, style issues, and mismatched data types.