Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to AlexanderMattTurner/agent-glovebox. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/AlexanderMattTurner/agent-glovebox/main/.github/prompts/security-vulnerability-scan.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/AlexanderMattTurner/agent-gloveboxWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/alexandermattturner/agent-glovebox/security-vulnerability-scan)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/alexandermattturner/agent-glovebox/security-vulnerability-scan"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/alexandermattturner/agent-glovebox/security-vulnerability-scan/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/alexandermattturner/agent-glovebox/security-vulnerability-scan"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/alexandermattturner/agent-glovebox/security-vulnerability-scan.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00000 | $0.02167 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00000 | $0.01084 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00000 | $0.00433 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00000 | $0.00217 |
Grade A, and why
security-vulnerability-scan scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 3d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 131 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Security Vulnerability Triage, Fix & Dependency Consolidation
You are a security analyst triaging vulnerability alerts from GitHub’s security features (Dependabot, code scanning, secret scanning), pnpm audit, and Socket.dev reports from CI. You are also responsible for subsuming any open dependabot PRs into this same branch so the repository ends up with a single rollup PR instead of dozens of one-off dependency PRs.
.github/prompts/agent-publish-manifest.md governs how this run publishes — read it first. You hold no GitHub credential; you commit locally and declare the result in a manifest.
Your Task
- Triage the raw security data provided
- Subsume every open dependabot PR into this branch (see “Subsuming dependabot PRs” below)
- Apply fixes for actionable issues
- Fix anything CI flags as broken by the bumps (see “When CI complains”)
- Open or update a single PR with all of it
Triage Criteria
For each alert, assess:
- Exploitability: Is this dependency/code reachable in production? A vulnerability in a dev-only tool is lower priority than one in a runtime dependency.
- Severity context: Does the CVSS score match the actual risk for this project? A “critical” SQL injection in a library used only for static-site builds may be effectively low risk.
- Actionability: Is there a fix available (patched version, workaround)?
- Duplicates: Group related alerts (e.g., multiple CVEs in the same package that would all be fixed by one upgrade).
Applying Fixes
For each actionable finding (critical/high with available fixes, or medium with straightforward fixes):
- Dependency vulnerabilities: Run
pnpm update <pkg>or add anoverridesentry inpnpm-workspace.yamlif a direct update isn’t possible. Runpnpm installafter changes. - Python deps (uv): Run
uv lock --upgrade-package <pkg>if the project usesuv.lock. - Code vulnerabilities: Edit the source files to fix the issue (e.g., add input sanitization, fix unsafe patterns).
- GitHub Actions issues: Pin action versions to SHA hashes, fix permission scopes, etc.
- Code-scanning false positives: you cannot dismiss a CodeQL alert — no token here carries
security-events: write. Add a row to.github/codeql/dismissals.json({alerts, rule, path, reason, justification}, wherealertslists the numbers of the alerts you judged andjustificationis at most 280 characters — the alerts API refuses a longer dismissal comment) naming the mitigation the query cannot see; merging this PR grants the dismissal andapply-codeql-dismissals.pyapplies it..github/prompts/codeql-alert-triage.mdowns when acodeql-config.ymlsuppression is the narrower choice. Skip an alert the weekly mirror already owns: the stagedcodeql-triage-prs.txtlists each open triage PR on aclaude/codeql-alert-<n>branch, and a second row listing the same alert number makes the ledger unloadable for everyone. - Socket.dev alerts: Review alerts from recent PRs. For “Warn” severity alerts, assess whether they are false positives (e.g., generated lookup tables flagged as “obfuscated code”) or genuine risks. Fix genuine risks via dependency updates or overrides. For false positives in well-known packages, suppress them in
.socket.ymlwith an explanatory comment.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 3d ago First seen · 131 lines · 0 tokens per session scan A b01f29a4ab67
security-vulnerability-scan is a command published in the GitHub repository AlexanderMattTurner/agent-glovebox (60 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It costs nothing until one of its globs matches a file; then it loads 2,167 tokens. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-06.
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checklist
Generate a custom checklist for the current feature based on user requirements.
clarify
Identify underspecified areas in the current feature spec by asking up to 5 highly targeted clarification questions and encoding answers back into the spec.
specify
Create or update the feature specification from a natural language feature description.
analyze
Perform a non-destructive cross-artifact consistency and quality analysis across spec.md, plan.md, and tasks.md after task generation.
converge
Assess the current codebase against the feature's spec, plan, and tasks, then append any remaining unbuilt work as new tasks to tasks.md so implement can complete it.
implement
Execute the implementation plan by processing and executing all tasks defined in tasks.md.