github-push

A command for securely pushing code to GitHub, the code-hosting service. It also handles repository documentation and settings, with optional pull requests and deployment of static sites to GitHub Pages.

In plain words
What is it for?
Checking for exposed credentials, pushing changes, updating a README and repository details, creating an optional pull request, and deploying static sites.
Why use it?
It combines code publishing with checks for secrets and routine repository maintenance.

Command

Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

agentmods
npx agentmods add commands/alfredang/skills/github-push
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/alfredang/skills
Per session 62 Only the description is in the session, so the agent can decide to use it. The body loads when it is invoked.
When invoked 3,314 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan C 1 finding. Scan, not verified.
Origin unknown No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5 $0.00062 $0.03314
Opus 5 $0.00031 $0.01657
Sonnet 5 $0.00012 $0.00663
Haiku 4.5 $0.00006 $0.00331

Measured yesterday against content hash 5485bbf1b980, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-08-30, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade C, and why

github-push scanned grade C with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured yesterday.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Reaches for credential fileshighPrivilege escalation

SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.

3. Check for sensitive files that should NEVER be committed: `.env`, `.env.*`, `*.pem`, `*.key`, `*.p12`, `*.pfx`, `credentials.json`, `secrets.json`, `id_rsa`/`id_ed25519`, `*.keystore`, `*.jks`, `.htpasswd`, `.netrc`,
commands/github-push.md · 176 lines

The source is not reproduced here

No licence file

A repository with no LICENSE is all rights reserved by default, so the body is not copied here. The metadata, the measurements and the link are.

Read it on GitHub

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. yesterday First seen · 176 lines · 62 tokens per session scan C 5485bbf1b980

Subscribe to this mod's changes

github-push is a command published in the GitHub repository alfredang/skills (2 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), with no licence file. It adds 62 tokens to every session and 3,314 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 1 finding (reaches for credential files). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.