Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ankitaa186/host-terminal-mcpWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/ankitaa186/host-terminal-mcp/permissions)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/ankitaa186/host-terminal-mcp/permissions"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/ankitaa186/host-terminal-mcp/permissions/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/ankitaa186/host-terminal-mcp/permissions"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/ankitaa186/host-terminal-mcp/permissions.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00008 | $0.00583 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00292 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00002 | $0.00117 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00001 | $0.00058 |
Grade C, and why
permissions scanned grade C with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Recursive force deletehighDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
- Blocked commands (like `sudo`, `rm -rf /`) are **always** blocked regardless of mode How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 105 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Permission Management
View and manage terminal command permissions.
Workflow
- Parse action from user input
- Execute the appropriate permission tool
- Display current status or confirm changes
Usage
/permissions status # View current settings
/permissions mode <mode> # Change permission mode
/permissions approve <command> # Approve a specific command
Actions
View Status
/permissions status
Shows:
- Current permission mode
- Allowed directories
- Number of allowed/blocked patterns
- Session-approved commands
Change Mode
/permissions mode allowlist # Only pre-approved commands (safest)
/permissions mode ask # Prompt for unlisted commands
/permissions mode allow_all # Allow everything (DANGEROUS!)
Approve Command
/permissions approve npm install
Approves a specific command for the current session (when in ask mode).
Permission Modes Explained
| Mode | Behavior | Risk Level |
|---|---|---|
allowlist |
Only commands in the allow list can run | 🟢 Safest |
ask |
Unknown commands prompt for approval | 🟡 Moderate |
allow_all |
All commands execute without checks | 🔴 Dangerous |
Example Output
🔐 Terminal Permissions
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Mode: allowlist
Allowed dirs: ~, /tmp
Timeout: 300s
Max output: 100,000 chars
Patterns:
✅ Allowed: 73 patterns
🚫 Blocked: 15 patterns
Session approved:
- npm install
- make build
Security Notes
allowlistis the default and recommended for productionaskmode approvals are session-only (not persisted)allow_allshould only be used in isolated/sandboxed environments- Blocked commands (like
sudo,rm -rf /) are always blocked regardless of mode - Changes can optionally be persisted to config with
persist: true
Configuration File
For permanent changes, edit ~/.config/host-terminal-mcp/config.yaml:
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 105 lines · 8 tokens per session scan C 1cdd24466985
permissions is a command published in the GitHub repository ankitaa186/host-terminal-mcp (0 stars, last pushed 6mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 8 tokens to every session and 583 once invoked, about $0.0000 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 1 finding (recursive force delete). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-01.
Other commands, from other repositories
checklist
Generate a custom checklist for the current feature based on user requirements.
clarify
Identify underspecified areas in the current feature spec by asking up to 5 highly targeted clarification questions and encoding answers back into the spec.
specify
Create or update the feature specification from a natural language feature description.
analyze
Perform a non-destructive cross-artifact consistency and quality analysis across spec.md, plan.md, and tasks.md after task generation.
converge
Assess the current codebase against the feature's spec, plan, and tasks, then append any remaining unbuilt work as new tasks to tasks.md so implement can complete it.
implement
Execute the implementation plan by processing and executing all tasks defined in tasks.md.