Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/askwigconsulting/cohortWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/askwigconsulting/cohort/update)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/askwigconsulting/cohort/update"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/askwigconsulting/cohort/update/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/askwigconsulting/cohort/update"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/askwigconsulting/cohort/update.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00017 | $0.00666 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00266 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00133 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00067 |
Grade A, and why
update scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Update this Cohort install to the latest upstream version.
First run cohort update --dry-run to preview the incoming commits and changed
artifacts without touching anything. Then run cohort update to fast-forward the
clone, reinstall the package if its dependencies changed, and recompile every
installed IDE.
Cohort refuses to update a dirty or diverged working tree — commit, stash, or reconcile first. Updates are never silent: nothing changes until you run the command, and only a clean fast-forward is ever applied.
Trust boundary. A fast-forward still runs the pulled commits' build/setup code
(pip install -e) and compiles their artifacts, so the residual risk is a
compromised upstream: a malicious commit that is nonetheless a valid
fast-forward. To gate against it, set require_signed = true under [update] in
~/.cohort/cohort.toml — Cohort then verifies the upstream tip with
git verify-commit before merging and refuses (exit 1) unless the commit carries
a signature git accepts.
The gate is only as strong as which key you trust, and this is on you to
configure: git verify-commit answers "signed by a key my git trusts," not
"signed by the Cohort maintainer." For it to mean anything, pin the signer —
set gpg.ssh.allowedSignersFile to a file containing only the maintainer's SSH
public key (recommended), or import and fully trust their GPG key. Note plain GPG
verification passes for any good signature from a key in your keyring regardless
of ownertrust, so an unpinned keyring is a weak bar. ~/.cohort/cohort.toml is
therefore security-sensitive — it selects the update source and toggles this
enforcement; keep it user-owned and not world-writable. The flag is off by
default, so the common clone-and-go flow is unchanged.
For a stronger, identity-pinned tier, set signed_by to a list of trusted key
fingerprints — the update then additionally requires the tip's signing key to
match one you pinned (not merely any key git trusts), and a non-empty signed_by
implies require_signed:
[update]
signed_by = ["SHA256:nuK/x67qH8e3I0UWKQQOTG5ggGCHcWrIfbVy810dHto"]
Get an SSH key's fingerprint with ssh-keygen -lf key.pub (the SHA256:… field),
or a GPG key's full fingerprint with gpg --fingerprint (a short/long key-id is
not enough — pin the whole fingerprint). Give it as a TOML array of strings, on one
line or several.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 54 lines · 17 tokens per session scan A 50facd1ecf9b
update is a command published in the GitHub repository askwigconsulting/cohort (2 stars, last pushed 19d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 17 tokens to every session and 666 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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