Getting it into your agent
This one installs as part of its plugin. Adding the marketplace and installing the plugin brings it with everything else the plugin ships.
/plugin marketplace add assafkip/kipi-system/plugin install kipi-dsseWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/assafkip/kipi-system/issue-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/assafkip/kipi-system/issue-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/assafkip/kipi-system/issue-review/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/assafkip/kipi-system/issue-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/assafkip/kipi-system/issue-review.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00021 | $0.02163 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00010 | $0.01081 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00433 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00216 |
Grade A, and why
issue-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 118 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Run the required reviews for the active DSSE issue. Execute in order:
-
Run
python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/issue_runner.py" status. Confirm an issue is loaded ANDreceipts.verifiedis set. Ifverifiedis null, stop. Tell the founder to run/issue-verifyfirst. Reviewing unverified code wastes Codex runtime. -
Pull the snapshotted scope. The runner stamped
allowed_filesinto state at load/approve so mid-issue spec edits cannot expand the review surface:ALLOWED=$(python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/issue_runner.py" allowed-files) ISSUE_ID=$(python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/issue_runner.py" status | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin).get('issue_id',''))")$ALLOWEDis a JSON array (e.g.["q-ktlyst/.q-system/agent-pipeline/schemas/**","q-ktlyst/.q-system/scripts/**"]). If empty, stop and tell the founder the spec has no scope. -
Try to claim a "standard" review slot before invoking Codex:
python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/issue_runner.py" record-review standard- Exit 0: slot claimed, proceed to step 4.
- Exit 2: cap reached (default 2 standard rounds). The runner names the cap and the override env. Stop and ask the founder if they want to opt in via
ISSUE_ALLOW_REVIEW_REPEAT=1for a single retry, OR triage and close with the existing review.
-
Invoke
codex:review(Codex native review) againstorigin/main. Build the focus text with the scope filter inline so Codex stays inside the contracted surface:Scope filter: $ALLOWED Limit findings to changes inside these paths. Code outside these paths is out of contract for this issue. If a finding requires touching files outside this list, mark it out-of-scope explicitly and do not propose a patch.Use
--base origin/main --backgroundunless the diff is trivially small (1-2 files). When the command returns, wait for completion viacodex:result/codex:status. Paste the full verdict block to the founder verbatim.$REVIEW_SOURCE/$ADVERSARIAL_SOURCEname the reviewer that actually ran. Never substitute one for another.Reviewer that ran $REVIEW_SOURCE$ADVERSARIAL_SOURCECodex codex-reviewcodex-adversarialClaude senior-staff-engineer subagent claude-reviewclaude-adversarialPick the row for the reviewer that ACTUALLY ran. Stamping
codex-*for a pass Codex did not run puts a false provenance record in the findings ledger — worse than being blocked, in a repo whose whole thesis is receipts. If one reviewer is unavailable (no credits, missing auth), use another row and stamp what ran. Do NOT hardcode an outage into this file: a stale availability note outlives the outage and sends every later session to the wrong reviewer.manualandplanare the author's own words and the writer refuses them here by design.Immediately pipe the standard-review findings to disk (compaction hardening: if the conversation compacts after this point, the findings survive because they are on disk, not in narrative memory). Translate Codex's free-form verdict into
[{severity, body, affected_path}]. The writer assigns sequential ids, stampscreated_at, marksout_of_scope=truefor paths outside$ALLOWED, and setsdisposition=pending:echo '<JSON_ARRAY>' | python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/issue_findings.py" \ add "$ISSUE_ID" --source "$REVIEW_SOURCE" --allowed-files-json "$ALLOWED"If the standard review returned approve with no findings, skip the writer call for this source. Do this before invoking the adversarial pass in step 6.
-
Try to claim an "adversarial" review slot:
python3 "${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/issue_runner.py" record-review adversarial- Exit 0: slot claimed, proceed to step 6.
- Exit 2: cap reached (default 1 adversarial round per slice). Stop. Ask the founder if they want to opt in via
ISSUE_ALLOW_REVIEW_REPEAT=1OR proceed straight to closeout.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 118 lines · 21 tokens per session scan A fb76172bc148
issue-review is a command published in the GitHub repository assafkip/kipi-system (110 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 21 tokens to every session and 2,163 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.