Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx agentmods add commands/cheezy/stride-security-review/security-reviewgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/cheezy/stride-security-reviewWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/cheezy/stride-security-review/security-review)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/cheezy/stride-security-review/security-review"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/cheezy/stride-security-review/security-review.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5 | $0.00028 | $0.12236 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00014 | $0.06118 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00006 | $0.02447 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.01224 |
Grade A, and why
security-review scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 4d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 446 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Run an AI-powered security review of code changes in this repository. Detects vulnerabilities across injection, authentication/authorization, data exposure, cryptography, input validation, race conditions, XSS/code execution, insecure configuration, and supply chain. For codebases that integrate LLMs, AI agents, or Model Context Protocol clients, five additional MAESTRO-derived classes activate when a file imports a recognized LLM/agent/MCP SDK: prompt injection, tool abuse, agent trust boundary, model output execution, and vector store poisoning. Filters out low-impact noise (denial-of-service, rate-limiting, memory-exhaustion).
What to do
Follow these steps in order. Do NOT skip steps. The command is a pipeline: parse args → gather input → dispatch agent → render output.
Step 1: Parse arguments
The user invoked you with the arguments $ARGUMENTS. Treat them as a space-separated list and walk the tokens in any order:
- If
--fullappears anywhere in the list, setFULL_MODE=trueand remove that token from the list. OtherwiseFULL_MODE=false. This selects between the two scan modes documented in the plugin README:diff(default) reviews working-tree changes againstHEAD;fullreviews tracked files end-to-end. - If
--jsonappears anywhere in the list, setJSON_MODE=trueand remove that token from the list. OtherwiseJSON_MODE=false. - If
--sarifappears anywhere in the list, setSARIF_MODE=trueand remove that token from the list. OtherwiseSARIF_MODE=false. This activates SARIF v2.1.0 output (see Step 5).--sarifand--jsonare MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE: their top-level JSON shapes are incompatible (one is the agent's native schema, the other is the SARIF document). If both flags are present, run a finalexit 2via Bash with one stderr line--sarif and --json are mutually exclusive— do NOT proceed and do NOT pick one silently. When both flags are absent, output is the human-readable report. - If
--maestroappears anywhere in the list, setMAESTRO_MODE=trueand remove that token from the list. OtherwiseMAESTRO_MODE=false. This activates MAESTRO 7-layer classification — each finding's JSON gains amaestro_layerfield, and the human-readable output adds a "By MAESTRO layer" subsection grouping findings by architectural layer. WhenMAESTRO_MODE=false, themaestro_layerfield MUST NOT appear in the JSON document (preserves byte-identical output for callers that don't opt in). See Cloud Security Alliance's MAESTRO framework for the seven-layer model. - If
--rciappears, look at the NEXT token. If it parses as an integer of at least1, consume it and setRCI_PASSESto the minimum of that value and3— out-of-range values are silently clamped to the cap of 3 (which bounds cost), never rejected. If the next token is missing, is not an integer, or is an integer less than1(zero or negative), do NOT consume it — leave it in the token list for the other bullets (so a path immediately following bare--rciis never eaten as a pass count) — and defaultRCI_PASSES=1. If--rciis absent,RCI_PASSES=0(no recursive criticism, single dispatch as today). RCI = Recursive Criticism & Improvement: after the standard dispatch produces a findings document, runRCI_PASSESadditional critique-and-refine dispatches that receive both the prior pass's JSON AND the original input, and asks the agent to drop false positives and surface anything that was missed. OpenSSF documents this technique as reducing security weaknesses by up to an order of magnitude. Combining--rciwith--fullis supported but expensive — N=2 over a 41-batch full scan is 41+82 = 123 agent dispatches. See Step 4.5 below for the iteration loop. Worked examples — every input shape has exactly one result:
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 4d ago First seen · 446 lines · 28 tokens per session scan A c60ff02cab61
security-review is a command published in the GitHub repository cheezy/stride-security-review (5 stars, last pushed 14d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 28 tokens to every session and 12,236 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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