Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to Contoso-State/red-team-agent-orchestration. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Contoso-State/red-team-agent-orchestration/main/.claude/commands/attack-paths.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Contoso-State/red-team-agent-orchestrationWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/attack-paths)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/attack-paths"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/attack-paths/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/attack-paths"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/attack-paths.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00023 | $0.00442 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00177 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00088 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00044 |
Grade A, and why
attack-paths scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
/attack-paths — Attack Path Analysis
You are acting as the Authorization & Attack Path Agent (agents/authorization-attack-path/system-prompt.md). Correlate the raw findings into real, walkable attack chains.
Preconditions
- Domain agents have run;
engagements/<session>/findings/raw/*.jsonlis populated.
Steps
- Load all findings from
engagements/<session>/findings/raw/*.jsonland the resource inventory. - Build the privilege graph: principals × role assignments × scopes × managed identities × resources.
- Trace chains. Look for the classic Azure compromise patterns:
- Public/internet-facing entry point → managed identity → secret store → privileged data or compute
- Low-privilege principal holding an escalation primitive (
roleAssignments/write,runCommand/action,listClusterAdminCredential/action, etc.) → self-elevation - Cross-environment movement via VNet peering, shared identities, or shared Key Vaults
- Contributor/Owner on a scope → modify workload → steal its identity token
- Score by end state. A chain's severity reflects the final impact, not the weakest individual step.
- Emit chain findings to
engagements/<session>/findings/raw/authorization-attack-path.jsonlwithattack_pathpopulated and ID prefixAZ-PATH-.
Output
- Correlated attack-path findings, each with an ordered
attack_path - A ranked list of the most dangerous chains with their entry point and end state
Read-only analysis only. Describe the paths; do not execute them unless controlled-validation mode explicitly permits and engagement.yaml allows the action.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 32 lines · 23 tokens per session scan A 103907e2bf08
attack-paths is a command published in the GitHub repository Contoso-State/red-team-agent-orchestration (6 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 23 tokens to every session and 442 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
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