Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to Contoso-State/red-team-agent-orchestration. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Contoso-State/red-team-agent-orchestration/main/.claude/commands/external.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Contoso-State/red-team-agent-orchestrationWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/commands/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/external)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/commands/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/external"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/commands/contoso-state/red-team-agent-orchestration/external.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00040 | $0.00955 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00020 | $0.00477 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00191 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00096 |
Grade A, and why
external scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 56 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/external — External Active Testing (EVA)
You are acting as the Orchestrator Agent (agents/orchestrator/system-prompt.md) dispatching the
External Vulnerability Agent (EVA) (agents/external-vuln/system-prompt.md). EVA is the only
agent that sends real traffic to live endpoints, so this command is hard-gated and OFF by default.
Preconditions (ALL required — otherwise stop and report what's missing)
engagement.yaml→mode: external-active-testingexternal_testing.enabled: trueexternal_testing.authorization.attested_byandattestation_idare set (a named human signed off)- the current time is within the authorized window, if configured
engagements/<session>/inventory/resources.jsonlexists (run/reconfirst if not)
If any precondition fails, do not dispatch EVA. Tell the user exactly what is missing and stop.
Steps
- Verify the gate. Re-read
engagement.yamland confirm every precondition above. If not satisfied, stop. - Build the Azure-derived allowlist. Run
node tools/external/build-targets.mjs --db engagements/<session>/engagement.db --session engagements/<session>. This producesengagements/<session>/scope/external-targets.json— the URLs/public IPs that map to in-scope Azure resources. If it is empty, report "no in-scope external targets" and stop. EVA may only ever touch hosts on this allowlist; theredteam-guardrailsegress hook enforces it fail-closed. - Dispatch EVA, passing the session path, the configured
external_testing.tier, andexternal_testing.limits. EVA always starts at thesafe-activetier and escalates only up to the configured tier:- Tier 1
safe-active—node tools/external/safe-prober.mjs --cwd . --out engagements/<session>/findings/raw/external-vuln.jsonl(benign headers/TLS/cookies/CORS/methods). - Tier 2
active-dast— scanners only viapwsh tools/external/Invoke-ScopedScan.ps1 -Tool nuclei|httpx|testssl|nikto|whatweb|zap-baseline. - Tier 3
exploit-validation— minimal, per-finding proof with explicit approval; never destructive.
- Tier 1
- Static analysis (opt-in). If
external_testing.static_analysis.enabled: true, EVA may pull code read-only from Azure intoengagements/<session>/static/and runpwsh tools/external/Invoke-StaticAnalysis.ps1 -Source engagements/<session>/static/<app>— OFFLINE only (the code is never executed). - Ingest findings into the datastore (
node tools/datastore/ingest.mjs --db engagements/<session>/engagement.db --session engagements/<session>). - Report progress: finding counts by check and severity; note the authorization reference and the coverage (which in-scope hosts were tested at which tier).
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 56 lines · 40 tokens per session scan A 3c344c8cd959
external is a command published in the GitHub repository Contoso-State/red-team-agent-orchestration (6 stars, last pushed 4d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 40 tokens to every session and 955 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-31.
Other commands, from other repositories
checklist
Generate a custom checklist for the current feature based on user requirements.
clarify
Identify underspecified areas in the current feature spec by asking up to 5 highly targeted clarification questions and encoding answers back into the spec.
specify
Create or update the feature specification from a natural language feature description.
converge
Assess the current codebase against the feature's spec, plan, and tasks, then append any remaining unbuilt work as new tasks to tasks.md so implement can complete it.
implement
Execute the implementation plan by processing and executing all tasks defined in tasks.md.
analyze
Perform a non-destructive cross-artifact consistency and quality analysis across spec.md, plan.md, and tasks.md after task generation.